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INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 
PERSPECTIVE  
LABOR IN NIPPON PROFESSIONAL 
BASEBALL AND THE FUTURE OF PLAYER 
TRANSFERS TO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
KEIJI KAWAI & MATT NICHOL 
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, the global search for talent by Major League Baseball 
(MLB) teams has resulted in a prominent number of professional Japanese play-
ers transferring to major league teams.  Sparking the movement of Japanese 
players from Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) to MLB was the transfer of 
Nomo Hideo in 1995, the first Japanese major league player since Murakami 
Masanori played for the San Francisco Giants in 1964 and 1965.  The phenom-
enal major league success of NPB stars like Nomo, Ichirō Suzuki,1 and Matsui 
Hideki has fuelled demand in MLB for Japanese players, leading to the high 
profile recruitments of players like Matsuzaka Daisuke, Darvish Yu, and most 
recently, Tanaka Masahiro.  Over the years since Nomo’s debut for the Los An-
geles Dodgers, the gradual erosion of legal, cultural, and normative barriers that 
prevented Japanese players from embarking on a MLB career have seen numer-
ous NPB players and some amateurs move to MLB clubs,2 resulting in a major 
 Keiji Kawai, Professor, Graduate School of Policy and Management at Doshisha University. Matt
Nichol, Assistant Lecturer, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University; Ph.D. can-
didate, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide. The authors received helpful feedback on earlier 
drafts and would like to thank Kent Anderson, Andrew Stewart, Stacey Steele, Christopher Arup, and 
John Howe.  The research conducted by Professor Kawai was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant 
Number 25301006.  The authors can be contacted by emailing Keiji Kawai at kkawai@mail.doshi-
sha.ac.jp. 
1. In contrast to Japanese custom and practice in professional baseball, the registered MLB (and 
NPB) name of Suzuki is Ichirō, and he is commonly known as Ichirō in Japan and the United States. 
2. The informal rule is that a Japanese amateur not selected in the draft can sign with a MLB club.
However, industrial league player Tazawa Junichi created controversy in 2008 when he was nominated 
for the draft and then requested not to be drafted.  He then signed a contract with the Boston Red Sox 
and the NPB clubs informally agreed to prohibit such players from playing in the NPB after playing in 
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league career being viewed in Japan as an acceptable pathway for NPB players.3  
Governing the movement of NPB players to MLB teams is the United 
States-Japanese Player Contract Agreement, an agreement first entered into by 
NPB and MLB in 1967,4 then amended in 20005 and again in 2013.6  A binding 
agreement on all clubs in both leagues, the United States–Japanese Player Con-
tract Agreement governs the movement of players between the two leagues and 
since 2000 has established the “posting” system, the rules and procedures for 
the transfer of reserved NPB players to MLB.  The posting system attracted 
much attention in 2006 in the United States and Japan when pitcher Matsuzaka 
Daisuke transferred from the Saitama Seibu Lions to the Boston Red Sox for a 
fee of $51.1 million and signed a six-year contract for $52 million.7  The hyper-
bole was repeated in 2011, when Darvish Yu8 moved to the Texas Rangers on 
a $60 million contract for six years and his team, the Nippon Ham Fighters re-
ceived a $51.7 million transfer fee.9  These two mega deals set the winds of 
change in motion. 
Various factors contributed to the unsuccessful transfer of a number of 
posted players, but the catalyst for change was the size of the transfer fees for 
Matsuzaka and Darvish, leading many small market MLB teams to challenge 
the posting system based on the grounds of equity and transparency.  As will be 
discussed in this Article, this unrest led to MLB notifying NPB of its intent to 
                                                 
MLB—a two-year ban for industrial and college players and a three-year prohibition for high school 
players.  Takahiro Horikawa, Dorahuto Kaikaku Kyuumu Genkin Jyuyo de Yokohama/Hanshin Owner 
Jinin [Urgent Reform of the Draft Needed After Owners of Yokohama and Hanshin Resign Due to Cash 
Payments to Recruit Players], ASAHI SHIMBUN (Osaka), Oct. 23, 2004, at 21. 
3. See generally Keiji Kawai & Matt Nichol, The Transfer of Japanese Baseball Players to Major 
League Baseball: Have Japanese Ball Players Been Internationalised?, in INTERNATIONALISING 
JAPAN AS DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE 180, 187–89 (Jeremy Breaden, Stacey Steele & Carolyn Stevens 
eds., 2014). 
4. UNITED STATES–JAPANESE PLAYER CONTRACT AGREEMENT (1967) [hereinafter 1967 
AGREEMENT]. 
5. UNITED STATES–JAPANESE PLAYER CONTRACT AGREEMENT (2000) [hereinafter 2000 POSTING 
AGREEMENT].  The use of the terms “post”, “posted” or “posting” in this article does not refer to the 
system of posted workers that operates in the European Union.  Council Directive 96/71, 1996 (EC). 
6. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL AND THE OFFICE OF 
THE COMMISSIONER OF NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL (2013) [hereinafter 2013 POSTING 
AGREEMENT].  
7. Scott R. Rosner & William T. Conroy, The Impact of the Flat World on Player Transfers in Major 
League Baseball, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 79, 86 (2009). 
8. Darvish has a Japanese mother and an Iranian father.  Jeff Passan, Iconic Ace Darvish Pushes 
Japan’s Boundaries, YAHOO SPORTS, (Mar. 24, 2008), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/iconic-ace-dar-
vish-pushes-japans-062000885--mlb.html. 
9. David Waldstein, Bidding for Japanese Players is a Denigrated Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/sports/baseball/darvish-is-up-for-bidding-and-system-in-
japan-draws-criticism.html.  
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reform the posting system in late 2012.  The Posting Agreement was entered 
into on December 16, 2013.10  Lurking in the background of the negotiations 
was the pending posting of another pitching phenomenon, Tanaka Masahiro.  
NPB’s 2013 season saw the history books rewritten numerous times11 when 
Tanaka accomplished the rare feat of recording twenty-four consecutive wins, 
a perfect regular season,12 and in doing so created a frenzy of interest among 
MLB teams.  The ink on the Posting Agreement 2013 had barely dried when the 
twenty-five-year-old Tanaka signed a seven-year contract for US$155 million 
with the New York Yankees,13 making him the fifth highest paid pitcher in ma-
jor league history.14  Not everyone was happy; Tanaka’s club, the Tohoku 
Rakuten Golden Eagles, received a transfer fee of $20 million, the maximum 
allowed under the new Posting Agreement,15 but far less than the $75 million 
transfer fee expected under the old protocols.16  
In light of the formal expiry of the 2013 Posting Agreement in December 
2016,17 an important question is whether the new posting system will actually 
improve the effectiveness of the transfer of reserved NPB players.  Will the new 
                                                 
10. MLB, NPB Reach Agreement on Posting System, MLB (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article/mlb/mlb-npb-reach-agreement-on-posting-sys-
tem?ymd=20131216&content_id=66013956&vkey=news_mlb [hereinafter MLB, NPB Reach Agree-
ment]. 
11. The Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles won their first Japan Series Championship and Curacao 
native Wladamir Balentien hit sixty home runs to break the single season home record of fifty-five 
home runs, shared by Oh Sadaharu, Alex Cabrera, and Tuffy Rhodes.  Jason Coskrey, Tanaka, Balen-
tien Earn MVP Honors, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.japan-
times.co.jp/sports/2013/11/26/baseball/tanaka-balentien-earn-mvp-honors/#.U1s91jlpvJw. 
12. Combining wins at the end of the 2012 season and during the 2013 postseason, Tanaka won 
thirty consecutive games, a record that ended with a loss in game six of the Japan Series. 
13. Associated Press, Masahiro Tanaka ‘Relieved’ About Deal, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/new-
york/mlb/story/_/id/10337617/japanese-pitcher-masahiro-tanaka-relieved-new-york-yankees-deal-
completed (last updated Jan. 23, 2014). 
14. The top four contracts for MLB pitchers at the time were Clayton Kershaw’s $215 million con-
tract with the Los Angeles Dodgers, Justin Verlander’s $180 million contract with the Detroit Tigers, 
Felix Hernandez’s $175 million contract with the Seattle Mariners, and CC Sabathia’s $161 million 
contract with the New York Yankees.  Erik Matuszewski, Yankees Give Tanaka Fifth Richest Pitcher-
Deal in MLB History, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-
22/yankees-tanaka-agree-to-155-million-contract-fox-sports-says.html. 
15. See MLB, NPB Reach Agreement, supra note 10. 
16. Some MLB executives estimated Tanaka’s transfer fee under the old system to reach as high as 
$100 million.  Jeff Passan, Japanese Ace Masahiro Tanaka Will Make Historic Money but Questions 
Abound, YAHOO SPORTS (Nov. 1, 2013), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/japanese-ace-masahiro-tanaka-
will-make-historic-money-but-questions-abound-171014762.html. 
17. If either league fails to provide notice of their intention to terminate or modify the agreement 
six months prior to December 16, 2016, the 2013 Posting Agreement continues to operate on a year-to-
year basis.  MLB, NPB Reach Agreement, supra note 10. 
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system create greater equity among MLB clubs in recruiting Japanese profes-
sional players?  Will Japanese players have greater labor mobility?  A broader 
question is whether the transfer of Japanese players to the major leagues is evi-
dence of the need for a global player transfer system to facilitate the movement 
of what is becoming an increasingly global labor market.  This Article aims to 
examine these questions and provide a framework to shape the dialogue on the 
future of the transfer system for Japanese players to MLB clubs.   
This Article will begin by providing an overview of the general structure of 
labor regulation in NPB, allowing Part III to analyse the key features of the 
posting system, its operation, and the new posting system.  Next, Part IV will 
review the status of the NPB’s labor regulation under Japanese labor law and 
competition law.  The Article will conclude by proposing reforms to the posting 
system and exploring whether baseball needs a global player transfer system. 
II. THE REGULATION OF LABOR IN NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL 
The labor system in NPB18 utilises many of the mechanisms in MLB used 
to control labor, for example, the player draft, the “reserve” system, and “free 
agency.”19  However, the NPB’s labor system operates differently from MLB’s 
system on a number of different levels, shaped by several structural features of 
the NPB.  This Article will now analyse the basic labor structure of the NPB, 
the key methods of regulation and regulatory actors in the NPB’s internal sys-
tem of labor regulation.   
A.  The Structure of Labor in Nippon Professional Baseball 
The NPB was Japan’s first professional baseball league and formed as a 
single league with seven teams in 1936.  Originally the Nippon Shokugyō Yakyū 
Renmei or the Nippon Professional Baseball Association, the league quickly 
changed its name several times and, in 1950, expanded to twelve teams and a 
two-league format, the Pacific League and the Central League,20 a format that 
                                                 
18. The clubs in the Pacific League are the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles, the Saitama Seibu 
Lions, the Chiba Lotte Marines, the Fukuoka Softbank Hawks, the Orix Buffaloes, and the Hokkaido 
Nippon-Ham Fighters.  The Central League clubs are the Yomiuri Giants, the Hanshin Tigers, the Toyo 
Hiroshima Carp, the Chunichi Dragons, the Yokohama DeNA Bay Stars, and the Tokyo Yakult Swal-
lows. 
19. First recognised in baseball in MLB salary arbitration in 1975, free agency permits a player to 
choose his employer after completing a specified number of years of playing service.  Jonathon B. 
Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the Reserve System to Free Agency, 15 SPORTS 
L. J. 21, 43–44 (2008). The NPB introduced “free agency” in 1993.  NPB, NIPPON PUROFESSHONARU 
YAKYŪ KYOYAKU [JAPANESE PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL BASIC AGREEMENT] , Ch. 22, art. 196–207 
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 NPB BASIC AGREEMENT]. 
20. The league was the Nippon Shokugyō Yakyû Renmei or Nippon Baseball Association in 1939, 
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continues today.21  Like the National League in MLB, the Central League has 
the higher status and prestige of the two leagues in NPB.  The regular season 
begins in late March and consists of 144 games, followed by the post-season 
from October to November.  The top three teams from each league compete in 
a two-stage Climax Series.  The first stage is a series between the second and 
third place teams, and the winner proceeds to the final stage against the league’s 
first place team.  The seven-game Japan Series is between the winners of each 
Climax Series.  The regular and post seasons are sandwiched between winter, 
autumn, and spring training camps, resulting in NPB players working every 
month of the year except January. 
Like MLB and other professional sports, internal regulation dominates the 
regulation of labor in NPB and is based on a system of voluntary self-regula-
tion.22  NPB, club owners and management, coaches, and players all perform 
regulatory functions influenced by formal rules, informal rules, and normative 
conduct.  Internal regulation extends to the playing of games, training regimes, 
and the internal structure of teams.  An important feature of this regulatory land-
scape is that large Japanese corporations own a NPB club and a minor league 
club.23  External regulation by the state can impact the regulation of player labor 
in NPB through areas like taxation law and contract law, but direct regulatory 
intervention by the state or the courts in the business of NPB is uncommon and 
will be discussed in Part IV.  
All NPB clubs can reserve a maximum of seventy registered players on 
what is commonly called the seventy-man roster, but a club’s ichi-gun (Division 
1) team has an active roster of twenty-eight players.24  The remaining rostered 
players are assigned to a club’s minor league team called ni-gun (Division 2), 
and the twelve ni-gun teams play in the Eastern or Western League.  Only two 
NPB clubs, the Fukuoka Softbank Hawks and the Toyo Hiroshima Carp, have 
                                                 
the Nippon Yakyū Hōkokukai or the Japan Baseball Society to Serve the Country in 1944, and the 
Nippon Yakyû Renmei in 1945.  SAYURI GUTHRIE-SHIMIZU, TRANSPACIFIC FIELD OF DREAMS: HOW 
BASEBALL LINKED THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN PEACE AND WAR 154–157, 177–180, 200, 225 
(2012).  
21. See NPB, http://www.npb.or.jp/eng/ (last visited May 11, 2015). 
22. Other forms of regulation include enforced self-regulation and co-regulation.  IAN AYRES & 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101–
128 (1992). 
23. Corporate owners of NPB clubs can be divided into traditional Japanese corporations like 
Yomiuri, Chunichi, and Hanshin, and new technology-based companies like Rakuten, Softbank, and 
DeNA.  This divide represents a shift from owners who were involved in newspapers and media, de-
partment stores, rail, and manufacturing. 
24. NPB, NIPPON PUROFESSHONARU YAKYŪ KYOYAKU (JAPANESE PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL 
BASIC AGREEMENT) art. 81(2) (2013) [hereinafter 2013 NPB BASIC AGREEMENT]. 
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formal san-gun teams (Division 3), a team that clubs otherwise operate unoffi-
cially for development purposes.  In addition to the seventy-man roster, all clubs 
maintain a roster of ikusei (development) players and these players can be trans-
ferred to the seventy-man roster.25  There is no limit on the number of foreign 
players permitted on a seventy-man roster but only four foreign players can be 
on an ichi-gun roster.26  The average salary of a player on a NPB twenty-five-
man roster is $500,000, considerably lower than the average salary of $3 million 
for a player on a MLB twenty-five-man roster.  However, the average salary of 
a ni-gun player is $218,000, which greatly exceeds the average $67,000 salary 
of Class AAA players27 and the in-season entry-level wages of minor league 
players of $1,110 per month.28   
B.  Contracting Practices in the Nippon Professional Baseball League 
Clubs in the NPB acquire entry-level labor by using selections in a player 
draft for first-year players in a system that closely resembles the MLB amateur 
draft.  A peculiarity of the NPB draft is that more than one team can select a 
player in a given round, and in such circumstances, a lottery is used to determine 
the drafting club.29  All players selected in the draft who agree to a contract with 
their drafting club must sign a Uniform Player Contract (UPC).30  Like uniform 
contracts in MLB, NPB UPCs permit limited negotiation, and draftees can only 
negotiate the amount of the signing bonus.31  A small number of a club’s top 
players sign lucrative multi-year contracts; but, the majority of players annually 
sign a contract for a term of one-year, and a player’s salary can fluctuate from 
                                                 
25. NPB, NIPPON PURO YAKYŪ IKUSEI SENSYU NI KANSURU KIYAKU [THE RULE ON 
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL DEVELOPMENT PLAYERS] art. 1 (2006, revised 2013). 
26. The restriction on foreigners on the active roster permits a maximum of three pitchers and one 
position player or vice versa. 2013 NPB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 26, art. 82(2).  For an overview 
of foreign player limits in NPB, the Korean Professional Baseball League and the Chinese Professional 
Baseball League, see generally, Naoki Chiba, Pacific Professional Baseball Leagues and Migratory 
Patterns and Trends: 1995-1999, 28 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 193 (2004).  
27. GLENN M. WONG & KEIJI KAWAI, SUPŌTSU BIJINESU NO HO TO BUNKA: AMERIKA TO NIHON 
[SPORTS BUSINESS LAW AND CULTURE: THE U.S. AND JAPAN] 349 (2012).  From 2014, the minimum 
minor league salary for a player with at least one day of service on an active roster, or who has signed 
two or more MLB contracts, is $81,500.  2012–2016 BASIC AGREEMENT art. VI, sec. A(3). [hereinafter 
2012 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT]. The minimum minor league wage for players signing their first MLB 
contract is $40,750.  Id.  
28. Garret R. Broshuis, Touching Baseball’s Untouchables: The Effects of Collective Bargaining 
on Minor League Baseball Players, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 51, 63 (2013). 
29. NPB, SHINJIN SENSHU SENTAKU KAIGI YAKYŪ [RULE OF THE NPB DRAFT], art. 9 (2006) 
[hereinafter RULE OF NPB DRAFT]. 
30. NPB, TOUITSU KEIYAKUSHO [UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT] (2011) [hereinafter NPB UPC].  
31. NPB, NIPPON PUROFESSHONARU YAKYŪ KYOYAKU [JAPANESE PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL 
BASIC AGREEMENT] art. 45, 47 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 NPB BASIC AGREEMENT]. 
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year to year based on performance or if a club reduces its total payroll.  All NPB 
UPCs include a reserve clause that gives the NPB club control over a player’s 
labor as a professional baseball player in Japan for a minimum of seven years.32  
Clubs lose their reserve rights by assigning their reserve rights to another NPB 
club through a trade, or to a MLB club through the posting system.  Alterna-
tively, NPB’s contract system allows players who are unconditionally released 
through a process called senryokugai to sign with any club as a jiyū keiyaku 
sensyu (free agent).33 
C.  Free Agency in Nippon Professional Baseball 
The introduction of free agency in NPB in 1993 was not the product of lob-
bying by the Japanese Professional Baseball Players Association (JPBPA), but 
by the league’s most powerful club, the Yomiuri Giants, who wanted to use free 
agency to acquire the best players from other NPB clubs.  Unlike the minor 
league baseball system in the United States, no system of free agency exists for 
players in the NPB’s minor league system, as free agent qualification is based 
on ichi-gun team service.34  In 1993, free agency required ten years of playing 
service,35 and the JPBPA renegotiated qualification to nine years of service in 
1997.  But the ten years of service was retained for players drafted through the 
gyaku-shimei system or “reverse-designation” draft pick system.36  In 2003, the 
reverse-designation system was abolished and all players qualified for free 
agency after nine years of service.37   Depending on the classification of a player 
under the Basic Agreement, clubs that lose a free agent to a NPB team may be 
entitled to compensation.38 
                                                 
32. Id. art. 66–74; NPB UPC, supra note 30, at cl. 31.  
33. 2013 NPB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 24, art. 58. 
34. Service is calculated by the number of days on an ichi-gun roster: seven years of service is 
calculated as 1,015 days and eight years of service is 1,160 days.  NPB, FURĪĒJENTO KIYAKU [RULE 
OF FREE AGENT] art. 2  (2009) [hereinafter RULE OF FREE AGENT]. 
35. 1993 NPB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 19, art. 196–207. 
36. This system allowed college and industrial league players to negotiate to be selected by their 
preferred club during the first two rounds of the NPB draft.  Giants Grab Olympian Early in Amateur 
Draft, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 18, 2000) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2000/11/18/baseball/giants-
grab-olympian-early-in-amateur-draft/#.UoU9-DlpvJx.  Clubs that utilized the reverse-designation sys-
tem were permitted to negotiate directly and freely with up to two non-high school players in the draft.  
Such clubs forfeited their first and second high school draft selections. 
37. NPB, NIPPON PUROFESSHONARU YAKYŪ KYOYAKU [JAPANESE PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL 
BASIC AGREEMENT] art. 197 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 NPB BASIC AGREEMENT]. 
38. Compensation for the loss of domestic free agents is based on a player’s rank in club salary for 
the player’s last season. Compensation can be money or a player, but clubs are permitted to protect 
twenty-eight players from compensation.  Id. art. 10.   
 
KAWAI-NICHOL ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/06/2015  4:03 PM 
498 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 25:2 
The introduction of a dual system of domestic and international free agency 
in 2008 represents a reform to NPB’s labor system.  Collective bargaining 
caused the JPBPA and the NPB to agree to introduce a dual system of domestic 
and international free agency. International free agent qualification remained at 
nine years of service,39 but reduced the qualification period for domestic free 
agency became dependent on when and from where a player was drafted.  Play-
ers drafted before 2006, or from high school after 2007, require eight years of 
service to qualify as a domestic free agent, while players drafted after 2007, or 
from college or industrial teams, only require seven years of service.40  
D.  The Operation of the Free Agent Market in Nippon Professional Baseball 
Despite the formal right to become a free agent, there is no robust free agent 
market in NPB.  A key factor contributing to this situation is that most players 
who qualify for domestic and international free agency do not elect to become 
a free agent.  For example, only twenty-nine players in the NPB used free 
agency to change clubs between 1993 and 2012.41   Practice within individual 
clubs reinforces the league trend.  During this period at the Hanshin Tigers, 
twenty-five players exercised their right to become a free agent but only eight 
players changed clubs: five transferred to other NPB clubs and three to MLB 
clubs.42  These numbers indicate that in Japan, a free agent’s right to negotiate 
with other clubs is frequently counterbalanced by the ability of the player’s club 
to match or exceed offers received by the player from the market, and the fact 
                                                 
“A rank” players were in a team’s top three players for salary and compensation is either 
money (80 per cent of the player’s last salary) or money (50 per cent of player’s salary) and 
one unprotected player.  
 
“B rank” players were in a team’s top four to ten salary earners and compensation is either 
money (60 per cent of the player’s last salary) or money (40 per cent of player’s salary) and 
one unprotected player.  
“C rank” players are all other players and teams receive no compensation for these players. 
 
Id. 
39. RULE OF FREE AGENT, supra note 34, art. 2(2). 
40. Id. art. 2(1). 
41. Seibu FA Ryūshutsu Iya, kishi ni 3 Nen Keiyaku Teiji [Seibu Oppose Player Talent Drain: Offer 
Kishi a 3-year Contract], NIKKAN SPORTS (Tōkyō) (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.nik-
kansports.com/baseball/news/p-bb-tp0-20131130-1224995.html. 
42. Hanshin, Kore Made No FA Sengen de 25 Ninchuu 8 Nin Ryūshutsu [At Hanshin, 8 of 25 Players 
Who Declared Free Agency Moved to Another Team], SANSPO (Tōkyō) (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.sanspo.com/baseball/news/20131113/tig13111305020010-n1.html. 
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that the first year salary of a free agent who transfers to a new club cannot ex-
ceed the salary paid by his current club.43  Then, there are the clubs who refuse 
to participate in the free agent market, like the Toyo Hiroshima Carp, who have 
never signed a NPB free agent.44  From the perspective of clubs like the Carp, 
the loss of a player as compensation for acquiring a free agent can be a deterrent 
in acquiring domestic free agents. 
The structure of free agency also limits the free agent market in NPB.  Nat-
urally, the length of service to qualify for free agency will make it difficult for 
many players to even qualify for free agency.  Nakazato Minoru and J. Mark 
Ramseyer noted that research conducted by the JPBPA found that most players 
did not qualify as a free agent under the nine years of service requirement.  In 
fact, nine years of service took the average NPB player eleven and a half years 
to complete, and eligible free agents took anywhere between ten and seventeen 
years to qualify.45  Making qualification even more difficult is the absence of a 
minor league free agent system as ni-gun service is excluded from the calcula-
tion of free agency.  Another relevant factor related to the structure of free 
agency is a player who changes NPB club as a domestic free agent must com-
plete an additional four years of service to become an international free agent,46 
an important consideration for players with aspirations of pursuing an MLB ca-
reer.   
Cultural factors like loyalty, groupism, and deference to the team influence 
a Japanese player’s decision to change team, shaping the operation of free 
agency and even the posting system.  An important cultural factor shaping rela-
tionships among taikukai (sports-minded people) is ongaeshi, the duty to repay 
one’s obligations.47  Traditionally, this concept was important in the context of 
professional baseball as it influenced player relationships between senpai (sen-
iors) and kohai (juniors), playing a central role in when a player could change 
clubs.  However, since the turn of the twenty-first century, as clubhouse rela-
                                                 
43. This salary restriction only applies to the first year of a contract signed by a domestic free agent 
and there is no limit on salary beyond the free agent player’s first year at his new club. RULE OF FREE 
AGENT, supra note 34, art. 7.  
44. Hiroshima, FA Senshu Kakutoku Zero Demo Ninki No Himitsu [Hiroshima Has a Secret to Be 
Popular, Even Though They Have Acquired Zero Free Agents], DAILY SPORTS ONLINE (Kinki) (Oct. 
15, 2013), http://www.daily.co.jp/baseball/carp/2013/10/15/0006422106.shtml. 
45. Minoru Nakazato & J. Mark Ramseyer, Bidding for Ballplayers: A Research Note, 26 J. 
JAPANESE L. 85, 94 (2008). 
46. RULE OF FREE AGENT, supra note 34, at art. 5. 
47. Keiji Kawai, Posting Seido no Houteki Kenshou [A Legal Study of the Posting System: Does the 
NPB Standard Player Contract Have Binding Power to Restrict a Japanese Player's Transfer to Over-
seas Leagues?], 60 DOSHISHA L. REV. 1081, 1110 (2008).  Ongaeshi is particularly important for 
taiikukai (sports-minded people) or bukatsu (club activities). 
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tionships are no longer defined by human relations but by contract-based rela-
tions, the past fifteen years have seen a decline in the role of ongaeshi in Japa-
nese professional baseball. 
E.  Regulatory actors in Nippon Professional Baseball 
Internal regulatory actors dominate the regulatory landscape of the NPB and 
Japanese baseball in general.  Internal regulatory actors include the corporate 
owners of clubs who act individually in regulating the labor of their team and 
as a collective through the institution of NPB.  Players perform the role of in-
ternal regulatory actor on the field, in the clubhouse, and as a collective at the 
industry level through the labor union, the JPBPA.  Industry-based unions like 
the JPBPA are uncommon in Japanese labor relations and “ more than [ninety] 
percent of labor unions [in Japan] are organized at the enterprise level.”48  Since 
2000 player agents have been permitted to represent NPB players but are likely 
to be viewed by clubs as an external regulation.49  Other external regulatory 
actors include MLB, the traditional external actors of the state, and the courts, 
which, as will be seen below, are peripheral actors in the regulation of NPB. 
III. THE POSTING AGREEMENT AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS FROM NIPPON 
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL TO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
Reviewing all three United States-Japanese Player Contract Agreements is 
important in understanding the historical changes in the NPB’s labor market,50 
its regulation, and how clubs in Japan and the United States have responded to 
these changes.  Examining the regulatory function and operation of the 1967 
and 2000 Agreements assists in understanding the aims of the 2013 Amend-
ments and how the transfer system may evolve in the future.  Part III will now 
analyse the transfer system in the Posting Agreement 2000, specifically focus-
ing on the operation of the rules and procedures in the original posting system, 
and will conclude by examining the new posting system and its first transfer of 
Tanaka Masahiro. 
                                                 
48. MATTHEW FINKIN, ET AL., MULTINATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE 
LAW: COMMON WORKPLACE PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS 64 (2013). 
49. Player agents must be attorneys in Japan and can only represent one player.  See generally 
JPBPA, http://jpbpa.net/system/problem.html (last visited May 11, 2015).  
50. Note that the 1967 Agreement and Articles 1 through 3 of the 2000 Posting Agreement regulate 
the transfer of MLB players to NPB clubs and since the 1960s, have facilitated the movement of many 
from major and minor league players to NPB clubs.  
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A.  Background to the 2000 Posting Agreement 
The Nankai Hawks sent ni-gun pitcher Murakami Masanori to the United 
States in 1964 to train with a minor league affiliate of the San Francisco Giants.  
Murakami was selected to play for the Giants’ major league club, triggering a 
clause in his contract with the Giants that resulted in the Giants trying to pur-
chase Murakami from Nankai for $10,000.51  As a result, both the Hawks and 
the Giants argued that they held the reserve rights to Murakami, and NPB and 
MLB resolved the matter by allowing Murakami to play for San Francisco in 
1965 and 1966, then return to NPB.  Consequently, NPB and MLB entered the 
1967 Agreement that in effect required clubs to honour the other league’s re-
serve system by requiring clubs interested in a reserved player from the other 
league to contact the player’s club.52  Combined with Japanese cultural prac-
tices, the 1967 Agreement erected a barrier that prevented Japanese professional 
players from transferring to MLB clubs, and created an insular labor market that 
was largely isolated from foreign leagues.   
The 1967 Agreement was an effective formal barrier for Japanese players 
transferring to MLB clubs until a weakness was exposed and exploited in 1995.  
In representing Nomo Hideo, player agent Nomura Don through Arn Tellem, a 
player agent in the United States, identified a loophole in NPB’s by-laws that 
allowed an NPB player to voluntarily retire from the league and then continue 
his career in a foreign league.  Nomo used Tellem’s interpretation of the volun-
tary retirement clause to retire from the Osaka Kintetsu Buffaloes.  The subse-
quent recruitment of Nomo by the Los Angeles Dodgers did not violate the 1967 
Agreement.53  Nomo’s transfer resulted in a number of NPB players negotiating 
with their clubs to arrange transfers to MLB clubs,54 most notably, Irabu Hideki, 
another Nomura client.  The trade in 1996 by the Chiba Lotte Marines of Irabu 
to the San Diego Padres saw an infuriated Irabu threaten litigation in Japan and 
the United States unless he was permitted to play for his club of choice, an out-
come facilitated by San Diego trading Irabu to the New York Yankees.55 
By the turn of the new century, the 1967 Agreement was out-dated and in 
need of urgent reform if the movement of Japanese players to major league clubs 
                                                 
51. ROBERT WHITING, THE MEANING OF ICHIRO: THE NEW WAVE FROM JAPAN AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 72–75 (2004).  
52. 1967 AGREEMENT, supra note 4, art. 1–4. 
53. William Gould IV observed that the recruitment of Nomo was not coincidental in light of MLB’s 
labor problems, culminating with the 1994–1995 labor strike and cancelled World Series.  William B. 
Gould IV, Bargaining, Race, and Globalization: How Baseball and Other Sports Mirror Collective 
Bargaining, Law, and Life, 48 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2013). 
54. These players included Kashiwada Takashi, Hasegawa Shigetoshi, Ohka Tomokazu, and Al-
fonso Soriano, who were recruited by the Hiroshima Toyo Carp from the Dominican Republic. 
55. For a general discussion on these and other transfers in the 1990s, see Whiting, supra note 51. 
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was to operate in a fair and transparent manner.  In Japan, NPB clubs were con-
cerned about the potential impact of an uncontrolled “talent drain” on the status 
and level of competition of the league.  Similarly, many MLB clubs worried 
about a level playing field in recruiting Japanese players as the Irabu trade was 
facilitated by a “working agreement” between Lotte and San Diego.  These fac-
tors and the desire of both leagues to avoid the type of litigation threatened by 
Irabu56 led to the creation of the 2000 Posting Agreement, an agreement that 
continued to allow NPB players who were free agents or unconditionally re-
leased to transfer to an MLB club.57  Marking a historical shift in the regulation 
of labor in NPB, the 2000 Posting Agreement created a new transfer mechanism 
for reserved players called posting58 and will now be analysed for the remainder 
of Part III.  
B.  Procedures for Posting a Player 
The posting system allows reserved NPB players to transfer to MLB before 
serving the nine years required to qualify as an international free agent.  In ef-
fect, the posting was a blind auction system that allowed NPB clubs to retain 
control over their players and receive financial compensation for reserved play-
ers who transferred to the major leagues.  In principle, this system provided all 
MLB clubs with equal access to elite players in NPB and allowed professional 
Japanese players to embark on a MLB career without meeting the arduous ser-
vice requirements of international free agency.  However, as will now be seen, 
these policy objectives were not achieved. 
The procedures of the posting system are activated when a player requests 
to be posted by his club during the posting period between November 1st and 
March 1st of the following year.59  If the club consents, the player’s details are 
then “posted” by the Commissioner of the NPB to the Commissioner of MLB, 
who then provides details of the posted player to all MLB clubs.60  An MLB 
club wanting to recruit the player has four days to submit a monetary bid to the 
Commissioner of MLB61 and was commonly known as a “posting fee.”  For a 
period of thirty days, the club with the highest bid received the “sole, exclusive, 
and non-assignable right to negotiate with and sign the posted Japanese 
Player[s].”62  If the player and MLB club agreed to a contract, the MLB club 
                                                 
56. Gould, supra note 53, at 25–26. 
57. 2000 POSTING AGREEMENT, supra note 5, art. 5–6. 
58. Id. art. 5, 8–12. 
59. Id. art. 9. 
60. Id. art. 8.  
61. Id. art. 9. 
62. Id. art. 9, 11. 
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was required to pay the posting fee to the player’s NPB club within five days of 
reporting the terms of the contract to the Commissioner of MLB.63  At this time 
the player transfers to his new MLB club.  However, failure of the parties to 
agree to a contract terminated the major league club’s negotiation rights and 
their obligation to pay the posting fee.  In this situation, the player would return 
to the NPB club and seek to be posted during the next posting period,64 or trans-
fer as an international free agent. 
C.  Controlling Player Labor and the Decision to Post a Player 
The transfer of Japanese players in the 1990s occurred in an uncontrolled, 
ad hoc manner that created a cloud of uncertainty in the NPB’s labor relations 
with players.  Therefore, a key aim of the NPB in entering the Posting Agree-
ment was to create certainty in contractual relations and return control of labor 
to clubs.  Granting NPB clubs the right to consent to posting a player was the 
tool used to achieve this aim,65 and it eased concerns at the time in the NPB 
about the perceived threat of American imperialism and the prospect of the NPB 
becoming a de facto minor league.66  Generally, players who receive consent 
are either one or two years from becoming an international free agent who have 
completed a minimum of seven years of service required to become a free 
agent.67  William Gould IV analogises this practice to MLB clubs trading play-
ers just prior to the player becoming a free agent so as to receive compensation 
beyond the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.68  The factors dis-
cussed above that limited the free agent market also affects the number of play-
ers posted by NPB clubs as only twenty-three players have been posted and only 
fourteen players transferred after signing contracts.69  
No uniformity exists in the decision process of an NPB club posting a 
player, and the decision is ultimately influenced by the status of the club and the 
player.  For example, Japan’s most prestigious, wealthy, and influential sporting 
club, the Yomiuri Giants have never posted a player, nor are they likely to post 
                                                 
63. Id. art. 11. 
64. Id. art. 12. 
65. See id. art. 6. 
66. See Gould, supra note 53, at 26.  Tanaka’s posting in December 2013 was added to Gould’s 
statistics.  
67. Darvish and Tanaka each completed seven years of service prior to being posted.  See Hokkaido 
Nippon-Ham Fighters, Darvish Yu, NPB, http://bis.npb.or.jp/eng/players/61965110.html (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2015); Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles, Tanaka, Masahiro, http://bis.npb.or.jp/eng/play-
ers/11215114.html (last visited May 11, 2015).  
68. Gould, supra note 53, at 25. 
69. Id. at 26. 
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a player in the immediate future.  Instead, Yomiuri players are required to trans-
fer to the major leagues by completing the nine-year service requirement to be-
come an international free agent.70  While not adopting the hard line of Yomiuri, 
the Hanshin Tigers are also a powerful foundation NPB club, who have only 
posted one player, Igawa Kei, who transferred to the New York Yankees in 2006 
for a posting fee of $26 million.71  Hanshin was recently confronted with a sim-
ilar decision and refused posting requests by star closer Fujikawa Kyuji over 
several years.  Fujikawa was forced to transfer to the Chicago Cubs in 2013 as 
a thirty-two-year-old international free agent.72  His transfer demonstrates why 
players want to be posted when they are younger.  Fujikawa suffered a season 
ending elbow injury early in the first year of his contract and required recon-
structive elbow surgery.   
Smaller and less prestigious NPB clubs that have low revenue bases are 
more likely to post star players.  Substantial financial compensation is a com-
pelling motivation for the owners of such clubs to post a player, and the corpo-
rate owner typically acquires the entire posting fee.  In 2006, the Saitama Seibu 
Lions posted twenty-six-year-old pitcher, Matsuzaka Daisuke to the Boston Red 
Sox for a posting fee of $51.1 million.73  Then, in 2011, the Hokkaido Nippon 
Ham Fighters posted another young phenomenon, twenty-five-year-old Darvish 
Yu to the Texas Rangers for a posting fee of $51.1 million.74  Neither the Lions 
nor the Fighters are shackled by the conservative practices of teams like 
Yomiuri and the players benefitted from receiving long-term contracts, financial 
security and embarking on a MLB career at the peak of their athletic perfor-
mance.  
D.  Problems Created by Posting Fees 
Much of the debate on the posting system focuses on the rapid growth in 
the value of posting fees and the perceived “windfall” received by many NPB 
                                                 
70. Since 2000, the following players have transferred from Yomiuri to MLB teams as international 
free agents: Matsui Hideki in 2003, Uehara Koji in 2009, and Takahashi Hisanori in 2010. 
71. David Brown, Stuck: Yankees Pay Japan’s Kei Igawa Big Money to Pitch in Minors, YAHOO 
SPORTS (July 24, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/blog/big_league_stew/post/Stuck-Yankees-pay-
Japan-8217-s-Kei-Igawa-big-m?urn=mlb-wp13697. 
72. Carrie Muskat, Cubs Finalize Deal, Introduce Fujikawa at Wrigley, CUBS.COM (December 7, 
2012), http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20121204&con-
tent_id=40523142&vkey=news_chc&c_id=chc. 
73. Boston and Matsuzaka agreed to a six-year, $52 million contract.  Rosner & Conroy, supra note 
7, at 86. 
74. Texas and Darvish agreed to a six-year, $60 million contract.  Waldstein, supra note 9. 
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clubs for high profile players.75  Such narrow debates mask many important is-
sues that relate to the effectiveness and limitations of posting fees as a transfer 
mechanism. The posting system was introduced as a blind auction in 2000 and 
that gave all MLB clubs the same formal rights to acquire talent from Japan, 
allowing the market to set the value of a player’s transfer.  In practical terms, 
the decision to pay a posting fee is essentially an exercise in economic rational-
ism and the allocation of resources.  Large market MLB clubs like the New 
York Yankees, the Boston Red Sox, the Texas Rangers, and the Los Angeles 
Dodgers possess the financial resources to pay astronomical transfer fees, a pay-
ment that along with the value of the contract of a posted (and free agent) player, 
is not in the calculation of a MLB club’s competitive balance tax76 or interna-
tional amateur signing pool.77  Clubs with lesser financial resources must deter-
mine whether to commit a portion of their baseball operations budget to a post-
ing fee for a professional player with no MLB experience, or alternatively, 
invest the same money in cheaper labor on the international market78 or acquire 
players on the MLB market.   
Bidding in the posting system also lacked transparency and Gould described 
the system as “bidding in the dark.”  As MLB clubs submitted bids without 
knowing whether other MLB clubs either placed or bid or the value of their bid, 
there was an inherently high risk of overbidding.  The player’s NPB club would 
receive any difference in the bids of the highest and second highest bid,79 an in 
efficiency in the procedure for the market setting the transfer value, and an 
amount that could otherwise be devoted to the player’s contract negotiations.  
The posting fees paid for pitchers like Igawa, Matsuzaka and Darvish put the 
                                                 
75. For critiques of the posting system, see generally William B. Gould IV, Globalization in Col-
lective Bargaining, Baseball, and Matsuzaka: Labor and Antitrust Law on the Diamond, 28 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y. J. 283 (2007); Matthew Piehl, Double Play: How Major League Baseball Can Fix 
the Amateur Draft and International Player Acquisition with One Swing, 8 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L. J. 
13 (2010); Victoria J. Siesta, Out at Home: Challenging the United States-Japanese Player Contract 
Agreement Under Japanese Law, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1069 (2008). 
76. For the method of calculating the competitive balance tax, see MLB BASIC AGREEMENT 2012, 
supra note 27, art. XXIII(B).  
77. Excluded players include players who have previously contracted with a major or minor league 
club and players over twenty-three years of age with at least five seasons of professional experience in 
a league recognised by the Commissioner of MLB’s office.  Id. art. 46(II)(E)(2). 
78. By 2006, the average signing bonus for players from the Dominican Republic had increased 
from $29,000 to $108,000. Gould, supra note 54, at 18.  Despite the average increase, clubs still use 
the “boatload” mentality of acquiring twenty Dominican players for $5,000 per player and using the 
academy-training camp system to identify the best players to send to the minor leagues.  Id. at 17–18.  
See also Timothy Poydenis, The Unfair Treatment of Dominican-Born Baseball Players: How Major 
League Baseball Abuses the Current System and Why It Should Implement a Worldwide Draft in 2012, 
18 SPORTS L. J. 305, 317 (2011).  
79. Gould, supra note 54, at 27. 
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spotlight on the issues of transparency, the rights of the player, market effi-
ciency, and equality. 
Transfer fees raise the difficult issue of what constitutes fair compensation 
to a NPB club for the loss of a reserved player, a person who is generally one of 
the team’s best players.  Providing insight into how to resolve this question is 
Nakazato and Ramseyer’s 2004 empirical research on NPB salaries.  Nakazato 
and Ramseyer examined when a Japanese player repays a club’s initial invest-
ments of a signing bonus and development costs80 and concluded that these costs 
are incorporated into the initial salaries of players.  They found that forty percent 
of hitters repay a club’s initial investment after their first year of ichi-gun ser-
vice,81 a number that is likely to be higher for pitchers, particularly starting 
pitchers.  As posted players generally have six to seven years of ichi-gun ser-
vice, the transfer fee for a reserved NPB player needs to reflect the impact of 
the on-field loss of the player, not the costs of recruitment and development.  
E.  Normative Practice and the Operation of the Old Posting System 
An important procedural feature of the posting system is that the winning 
bidder receives the exclusive and non-assignable negotiation rights to the Japa-
nese player for a period of thirty days.  The winning bidder cannot trade, sell, 
or assign the rights to another club.  The MLB club’s negotiation rights lapse if 
the parties do not agree to a contract in the thirty-day negotiation period, and 
the player’s NPB club retains the reserve rights to the player.   The posted player 
cannot be posted again until the next posting period.82  The operation of these 
procedures has seen normative practice negatively impact on the ability of the 
posting system to transfer posted players. 
The posting system is predicated on the assumption that MLB clubs will bid 
on posted players and several posted players have had the misfortune of receiv-
ing no bids.83  Even though the player has received the consent of his NPB club 
to play MLB, the posting procedures have prevented the players from seeking 
alternative methods of obtaining work in the major leagues.  In the case of 
Sanada Hiroki, the impact of receiving no bids in 2011 had disastrous conse-
quences for his club, the Yokohama DeNA Bay Stars, who allowed Sanada to 
pursue his MLB dream by releasing him from his contract.  Sanada became a 
free agent and attended trials with MLB clubs but was unsuccessful.  Instead of 
returning to the Bay Stars, who had relinquished their reserve rights, Sanada 
                                                 
80. Nakazato & Ramseyer, supra note 45, at 96–97. 
81. Id. at 97. 
82. 2000 POSTING AGREEMENT, supra note 5, art. 12. 
83. Sanada Hiroki, Otsuka Akinori, Iriki Yusaku and Mitsui Koji have been posted and received no 
bids. 
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signed with the Yomiuri Giants.84  The unconditional release of Sanada by 
Yokohama is uncommon and most clubs do not relinquish their reserve rights 
to posted players who do not transfer to a MLB club.  Almost all players are 
required to wait until the next posting period,85 and face the risk of again receiv-
ing no bids,86 or transfer as an international free agent.  
Normative conduct also began to effect the contract negotiations between 
the posted player and the winning bidder.  In 2010, the Tohoku Rakuten Golden 
Eagles posted star pitcher Iwakuma Hisashi and the Oakland Athletics secured 
the negotiation rights with a winning bid of $19.1 million, a curious outcome in 
light of the use of analytics and sabermetrics by General Manager, Billy Beane, 
made famous by the Moneyball book and film.87  A contract was not concluded 
and Iwakuma returned to Rakuten for the 2011 season before transferring to the 
Seattle Mariners as an international free agent on a one-year contract for $1.5 
million.88  Then, in 2011, the New York Yankees won the negotiation rights to 
posted infielder Nakajima Hiroyuki with a $2 million bid, and once again, the 
parties did not agree to a contract.   Nakajima returned to the Saitama Seibu 
Lions for one season before signing a two-year contract for $6.5 million with 
the Oakland Athletics as an international free agent.89  The bidding motivations 
of the Yankees were questionable, and at least odd, due to their high priced 
infield of All Stars at the time, evident in their refusal to guarantee Nakajima an 
opportunity to win a position in the starting line-up.90  The failed posting of 
Iwakuma and Nakajima highlight the ineffectiveness of the posting system to 
transfer to MLB reserved Japanese players who receive the consent and the will-
ingness of NPB clubs to attempt to cash in on the transfer of players in the pe-
nultimate year of a player’s qualification for free agency. 
E.  The New Posting System Protocols 
Problems in the operation of the posting system saw the JPBPA raise with 
                                                 
84. Sanada ga yonenburi kyojin hukkatsu! Mejya-wo dannen [Sanada Returns to Kyojin After 4 
years! Major Leagues Abandoned], SANSPO (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.sanspo.com/base-
ball/news/20120319/gia12031917310004-n1.html. 
85. 2000 POSTING AGREEMENT, supra note 5, art. 12. 
86. Mitsui Koji was unsuccessfully posted twice. 
87. See generally Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003). 
88. Geoff Baker, Mariners Sign Japanese Right-Hander Hisashi Iwakuma, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 5, 
2012), http://www.seattletimes.com/sports/mariners/mariners-sign-japanese-right-hander-hisashi-iwa-
kuma/. 
89. Josh Dubow, A’s Agree on $6.5 Million, 2-Year Contract with Nakajima, BIG STORY (Dec. 18, 
2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/agree-2-year-contract-nakajima. 
90. Rob Smaal, Wanted: Team to Fulfill MLB Dream. Serious Replies Only, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN 
(Osaka) (Jan. 31, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/sports/AJ201201310034. 
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the NPB the need for revising the system in December 2010,91 and in response, 
NPB considered the union’s request in 2011 but ultimately took no action.92  
The formal reform process emanated from the United States when a number of 
disgruntled MLB clubs pressured MLB to officially raise the prospect of re-
forms with the NPB at the end of 2012.93  Negotiations began in early 2013 and 
in an attempt to accelerate the process, in June 2013, MLB notified the NPB of 
its intention to terminate the Posting Agreement on December 15, 2013.94  Po-
tential areas of reform included allowing a posted player to negotiate with mul-
tiple MLB clubs, creating an open auction for a player’s contract rights and cap-
ping or developing a formula for calculating a player’s transfer fee.95  In the 
middle of 2013, negotiations were stalled by MLB’s Biogenesis drug scandal96 
and the ill health of Michael Weiner, the executive director of the Major League 
Baseball Players Association.  Further delays were experienced in October and 
November when the JPBPA lobbied NPB for changes to strengthen the rights 
of players to negotiate with multiple MLB clubs, and Tanaka Masahiro pro-
pelled the Golden Eagles to the Japan Series Championship and the Asia Series 
Championship.97 
In early November 2013, negotiations saw NPB and the JPBA approve a 
                                                 
91. Puro yakyū: nyūsatsuseido no kaikaku NPB ni youkyū he: rouso senshukai [Professional Base-
ball: JPBPA Requested NPB to Revise the Posting System], MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Tōkyō), Dec. 3, 2010, 
at 19. 
92. Puro Yakyū Jikkoui; Nyūsatsuseido ha Iji no Houkou [NPB Committee Take the Direction to 
Keep the Posting System], NIKKAN SORTS (Tōkyō) (June 13, 2011), http://www.nik-
kansports.com/baseball/news/f-bb-tp0-20110613-789962.html. 
93. Jeff Passan, MLB Seeking Changes to Posting System for Players from Japan, YAHOO SPORTS 
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/mlb-seeking-changes-to-posting-system-for-players-
from-japan-203422114.html. 
94. Ma-kun Konofu Mejya-Shoumetsu? A-Rod yoha shin posting kyoutei koushou atomawashi [Will 
Tanaka Lose the Chance to Transfer to MLB? The Effect of A-Rod’s Issue, Makes Negotiating a New 
Posting System a Low Priority], SPONICHI (Tōkyō) (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.sponichi.co.jp/base-
ball/news/2013/08/08/kiji/K20130808006375430.html.  For either league to terminate the 2000 Posting 
Agreement, notice was required at least 180 days before December 15, 2002.  2000 POSTING 
AGREEMENT, supra note 5, art. 17. 
95. Daru ga ugokashita ‘posting’ seido minaoshi [Darvish Sets in Motion Revision to the Posting 
System], SANSPO (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.sanspo.com/base-
ball/news/20121013/mlb12101305290000-n1.html. 
96. Ben Badler, As Teams Scout Masahiro Tanaka, Posting System Changes Could Be Coming, 
BASEBALL AM. (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.baseballamerica.com/majors/as-teams-scout-masahiro-
tanaka-posting-system-changes-could-be-coming/.  The scandal involved the distribution of Perfor-
mance Enhancing Drugs (PEDs), specifically human growth hormone, by the Biogenesis of America, 
to fourteen MLB players, including several high profile players. 
97. Nichibei Shinnyū Satsuseido no Hadan Bakkin Shiharaisaki ha MLB [Penalty Fee to Be Paid to 
MLB for Ending Negotiations with a NPB Player Under New Posting System], NIKKAN SPORTS 
(Tōkyō) (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.nikkansports.com/baseball/mlb/news/p-bb-tp2-20131107-
1214736.html. 
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new agreement proposed by MLB,98 only for MLB to withdraw the proposal 
before a formal agreement was concluded,99 initiating a new round of negotia-
tions in New York.  The imminent posting of Tanaka added to the time pressures 
and NPB and MLB finally agreed to a new posting on December 16, 2013.100  
The key features of the new protocols were: 
 
(1) The posting period operates from November 1st until Feb-
ruary 1st of the following year; 
(2) The negotiation period remains at thirty days; 
(3) Prior to posting a player the  NPB club sets the “release” 
fee (formerly the posting fee) and the amount cannot be 
changed; 
(4) Release fees are capped at $20 million; 
(5) Any MLB club willing to pay the release fee may negotiate 
a contract with the posted player; and 
(6) The term of the new Posting Agreement is three years but 
if neither league terminates the agreement six months prior 
to December 15, 2016 it continues on a yearly basis. 101 
 
The new protocols marked the end of the auction system and transferred the 
role of setting a transfer fee from the market to the player’s NPB club, repre-
senting a dramatic policy shift in the Posting Agreement as NPB clubs now de-
termine the financial cost of losing a player.  The renaming of the bid or posting 
fee as the “release” highlights that the transfer fee is not a value determined at 
auction, but a fee that releases a player from his contract and compensates the 
NPB club for relinquishing their reserve rights to the player.  The modification 
of the language in the posting protocols is important for calculating the transfer 
fee, and in improving parity among MLB clubs in the market for reserved NPB 
players, particularly as fees are now capped at $20 million.102  The new proto-
cols represent another major policy shift in the ability of posted players to 
                                                 
98. Sensyukai ga shin-nyūsatsuseido wo jyudaku [JPBPA Accepts the New Posting System], 
NIKKAN SPORTS (Tōkyō) (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.nikkansports.com/baseball/news/f-bb-tp0-
20131114-1218160.html. 
99. Barry M. Bloom, Impasse with Japan Puts Tanaka on Hold, MLB.COM (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article/mlb/posting-system-impasse-between-mlb-japan-puts-masahiro-
tanakas-future-on-hold?ymd=20131114&content_id=63920472&vkey=news_mlb. 
100. MLB, NPB Reach Agreement, supra note 8. 
101. 2013 POSTING AGREEMENT, supra note 6, art. 7-9, 15.  
102. It should be noted that it was reported that only one NPB club, the Tohoku Rakuten Golden 
Eagles, voted against the introduction of the new posting system. Shin posting wo shounin [Agreement 
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strengthen their bargaining position by negotiating with multiple major league 
clubs. Although this right is conditional on more than one MLB club agreeing 
to pay the release fee, the new procedure is a step towards the JPBPA achieving 
their aim of posted players possessing the unconditional right of players to ne-
gotiate with multiple MLB clubs.103 
F.  The First Posting Under the New Posting Protocols and Tanaka Masahiro 
One day after the new posting protocols were announced, Tanaka Masahiro 
announced on December 17, 2013, that he had asked the Tohoku Rakuten 
Golden Eagles to be posted,104 and after months of speculation, the Golden Ea-
gles announced on Christmas Day 2013 that they had consented to Tanaka’s 
request.105  Unsurprisingly, the release fee was set at the maximum of $20 mil-
lion and by the middle of January 2014, Tanaka was a New York Yankee after 
the two parties agreed to a seven-year contract for $155 million.  The number 
of clubs who negotiated with or contacted Tanaka’s representatives is un-
known,106 but the Los Angeles Dodgers, Chicago Cubs, Chicago White Sox, 
Arizona Diamondbacks, and Houston Astros all confirmed entering contract ne-
gotiations with the pitcher.  Media reports indicated that the Dodgers and Astros 
offered a contract that exceeded $100 million, the Cubs’ contract offer was less 
than $150 million, and the Yankees not only offered the most money but were 
also the only club to offer a seven-year contract.107 
The impact of Tanaka’s probable posting on negotiations between the NPB 
and MLB, and his transfer to the Yankees, raises the question as to whether the 
new posting protocols were able to achieve their underlying policy aims.  The 
aim of capping the release fee was to allow clubs other than large market clubs 
a realistic opportunity to recruit top Japanese talent.  But Tanaka’s transfer 
shows little has changed.  The two clubs with the highest bids, the Dodgers and 
the Yankees, respectively, had the highest and second highest opening day pay-
rolls in 2014.108  The ability of small market clubs like Houston and Arizona to 
                                                 
on New Posting System], YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Tōkyō), Dec. 17, 2013, at 25.  
103. Puro yakyū: nyūsatsuseido, supra note 91.  
104. Ma-kun Bei Iseki Kibou Tsutaeru: Ketsuron ha Mochikoshi [Tanaka Express His Desire to 
Transfer to MLB: The Decision Was Delayed], NIKKAN SPORTS (Tōkyō) (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nikkansports.com/baseball/news/f-bb-tp0-20131217-1232575.html. 
105. Rakuten Tachibana Syatyou to-ku Touhoku no Hokori wo Motte Mejya- de [Take the Pride of 
Tohoku to Play in MLB], NIKKAN SPORTS (Tōkyō) (Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.sanspo.com/base-
ball/news/20131225/gol13122517220010-n1.html. 
106. Casey Close from Excel Sports Management represented Tanaka, who also represents Clayton 
Kershaw and New York Yankees’ captain, Derek Jeter.  
107. Masahiro Tanaka ‘Relieved’, supra note 13. 
108. The total payroll at the start of 2014 MLB season for the confirmed bidders was: Los Angeles 
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sign Tanaka remain affected by finances as clubs like the Yankees and the 
Dodgers can shift the money once allocated to a posting fee to a player’s con-
tract.  Also coming into play was the duration of a club’s financial commitment 
to a player with no major league experience.  The Yankees’ lucrative offer of a 
seven-year contract not only had an impact on smaller market clubs, but also 
affected high payroll clubs like the Dodgers, who were restricted in their ability 
to exceed the Yankees’ offer by their long-term commitment to a number of 
high priced players.  Undoubtedly Tanaka benefitted financially and in terms of 
job security by negotiating with multiple clubs.  The loser in this transaction 
was Rakuten, who received a release fee of $20 million as opposed to a posting 
fee in excess of $50 million.  As Tanaka did not sign with small market teams 
like Houston or Arizona but the Yankees, it appears that the path to transferring 
an elite reserved Japanese player has changed, but the outcome is unchanged.  
IV. NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL’S TRANSFER SYSTEM TO MAJOR 
LEAGUE BASEBALL AND JAPANESE LAW 
During the eighty-year history of the NPB, no internal regulatory actor has 
sought to use Japanese labor law or competition law to challenge the NPB’s 
internal labor system and seek external regulatory intervention by the Japanese 
courts.  Disgruntled players occasionally make public threats of litigation109 and 
players seldom use dispute resolution mechanisms like salary arbitration to re-
solve salary disputes.110  However, it remains important to determine whether 
the NPB’s player transfer system and labor practices comply with Japanese law.  
                                                 
Dodgers $241 million—ranked first, New York Yankees $208 million—ranked second, Chicago White 
Sox $89 million—ranked twentieth, Chicago Cubs $74 million—ranked twenty-eighth, Arizona Dia-
mondbacks $111 million—ranked twelfth, and Houston Astros $44 million—ranked twenty-ninth. 
MLB Salaries, USA TODAY (May 14, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/mlb/sala-
ries/2014/team/all/. 
109. In the 1990s, Irabu Hideki and Alfonso Soriano, a Dominican Republican born player for the 
Toyo Hiroshima Carp, both threatened litigation in attempting to transfer to MLB.  Litigation was 
avoided when both players transferred to MLB clubs.  WHITING, supra note 51, at 130–34, 141–45. 
110. Since 1973, there have been seven cases of salary arbitration.  These cases involved five Jap-
anese players and two foreign players.  There is no independence on the arbitration panel as the arbi-
trators are the President of the NPB and two arbitrators appointed by the clubs.  The two successful 
players were Shimoyanagi Tsuyoshi in 2001 and Wakui Hideaki in 2001.  David L. Snyder, Automatic 
Outs: Salary Arbitration in Nippon Professional Baseball, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 79, 89–91 (2009).  
The use of salary arbitration is in direct contrast to MLB practices.  See generally, Ed Edmonds, A Most 
Interesting Part of Baseball's Monetary Structure - Salary Arbitration in Its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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Japanese labor law is comprised of the Labor Standards Act,111 the Labor Con-
tract Act,112 the Labor Union Act,113 and competition law as enshrined in the 
Antimonopoly Act.114  These laws will now be used to analyze the NPB’s labor 
system, specifically, free agency and posting. 
A.  Labor Law, Players and Nippon Professional Baseball 
The Labor Standards Act, the Labor Contract Act, and the Labor Union Act 
all adopt different definitions of an employee.  Therefore the ability of a worker 
to be recognized as an employee, not an independent contractor, and activate 
the labor protections afforded by the laws is dependent upon the worker’s status 
under each act.  The Labor Union Act provides the broadest legal definition of 
an employee, stating that an employee is a person “who ‘live[s] on their wages, 
salaries, or other equivalent income, regardless of the kind of occupation.’115  In 
contrast, the Labor Standards Act defines an employee as a person “employed 
at an enterprise or office . . . and receives wages. . . without regard to the kind 
of occupation.”116  The Labor Contract Act adopts a similar definition to the 
Labor Standards Act and classifies an employee as “a person who works by 
being employed by an employer and to whom wages are paid.”117  The critical 
difference between the Labor Contract Act and the Labor Standards Act is that 
the Labor Contract Act classifies kajishiyounin (domestic helpers or domestic 
servants) as employees.  
Players in NPB are held to be employees under the Labor Union Act and 
independent contractors according to the Labor Contract Act and the Labor 
Standards Act,118 a legal position that is largely the product of two matters in-
volving the JPBPA.  In 1985 Japan’s Labor Relations Commission recognized 
                                                 
111. Roudou Kijyun Hou [Labor Standards Act], Law No. 49 of 1947, amended by Law No. 42 of 
2012 (Japan) [hereinafter Labor Standards Act]. 
112. Roudou Keiyaku Hou [Labor Contract Act], Law No. 128 of 2007 (Japan) [hereinafter Labor 
Contract Act].  
113. Roudou Kumiai Hou [Labor Union Act], Law No. 174 of 1949, amended by Law No. 102 of 
2005 (Japan) [hereinafter Labor Union Act]. 
114. Dokusen Kinshi Hou [Antimonopoly Act; Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and 
Maintenance of Fair Trade] Law No. 54 of 1947 (Japan), translated by Japan Fair Trade Commission, 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/index.html [hereinafter Antimonopoly Act]. 
115. Labor Union Act, art. 3. 
116. Labor Standards Act, art. 9. 
117. Labor Contract Act, art. 2(1). 
118. Further complicating the regulation of labor of NPB players is that other Japanese laws adopt 
divergent approaches in viewing players as employees or independent contractors.  Players are inde-
pendent contractors under the Shotoku Zei hou [Income Tax Act] Law No. 33 of 1965, amended by 
Law No. 63 of 2013 (Japan), but employees according to the Antimonopoly Act. 
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the JPBPA as a labor union by applying the Labor Union Act.119  Then, in 2004, 
the merger of the Osaka Kintetsu Buffaloes and the Orix Blue Wave led to the 
NPB attempting to consolidate the number of clubs, thereby reducing the size 
of the player workforce.  In a rare public challenge to the authority of club own-
ers and NPB, the JPBPA sought judicial relief and held a two-day strike, the 
only labor strike in NPB history.  The Tōkyō High Court in the Nippon Profes-
sional Baseball League case120 used the Labor Union Act to conclude that the 
NPB’s attempt to consolidate the number of clubs pertained to a working con-
dition and was therefore a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.  Although 
the Tōkyō High Court did not explicitly state that players are employees, the 
decision was based on the underlying premise that players are employees, not 
independent contractors, fundamentally shaping the legal rights of NPB players 
under labor law.121 
B.  Mandatory Subjects of Collective Bargaining 
Working conditions that form part of a labor contract or the rules of em-
ployment can only be changed if a worker and employer reach an agreement.122  
Such changes cannot result in creating rules of employment that disadvantage 
the worker.123  However, Japanese labor law allows employers to unilaterally 
change general working conditions, if the change is reasonable.124  But if a labor 
union requests collective bargaining on a mandatory subject of bargaining, em-
ployers must negotiate working conditions.125  Refusal by employers to collec-
tively bargain without proper justification in such circumstances constitutes an 
                                                 
119. Puro yakyū sensyu ga roudou kumiai kubikakugo de danketu nakahata kaityou [The Unioniza-
tion of Professional Baseball Players Was the Result of the Firm Resolve of Union President, Even If 
He Could Be Fired], ASAHI SHIMBUN (Osaka), Nov. 15, 1985, at 22. 
120. Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] Sept. 8, 2004, 879 RŌDŌ HANREI 90 (Japan) [here-
inafter Nippon Professional Baseball League Case]. 
121. KEIJI KAWAI, PURO SPORTS SENSYU NO HOUTEKI CHII [LEGAL STATUS OF PROFESSIONAL 
LEAGUE PLAYERS] 423–41 (2003). 
122. Labor Contract Act, art. 8. 
123. Id. art 9.  Changes cannot be made to any employment rules a worker and employer had agreed 
would not be changed.  There will be no disadvantage to a worker if the employer informs the worker 
of the changed employment rules and the change is reasonable in light of the extent of the disadvantage 
to the worker, the appropriateness of the changes and other relevant circumstances to the changed em-
ployment rule.  Id. art. 10. 
124. Employers are permitted to change shugyou kisoku (work rule) for uniform working conditions 
without consent of employees on the basis the change is reasonable, otherwise the unilateral change 
will be declared void by a court.  The Labor Standards Act regulates shougyou kisoku and generally 
gives employees the right to voice their opinion on any changes.  Labor Standards Act, art. 89–92; 
Labor Contract Act, supra note 112, art. 10. 
125. KAZUO SUGENO, ROUDOU HOU [LABOR LAW] 126–50 (2012). 
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unfair labor practice.126  Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include 
matters within an employer’s control that affect the terms of an employee’s em-
ployment, the “treatment of union members and the management of collective 
labor relations.”127  As free agent qualification is the basis for an employee’s 
free choice and choosing one’s employer, and central to the collective manage-
ment of labor by clubs and NPB, it is a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing.  The issue of collective bargaining is particularly important in determining 
if the restraints in the reserve and free agent systems are enforceable restraints 
of trade. 
C.  Free Agency, Restraint of Trade and Japanese Labor Law 
The enforceability of the NPB’s free agent system under Japanese labor law 
will depend on whether the process of collective bargaining created a reasonable 
restraint of trade, and Japanese courts are likely to use the test from the Foseco 
Japan case.128  This case involved whether Foseco could enforce against a for-
mer employee a post-employment agreement not to compete that was two years 
in duration.  The Nara District Court found that the enforceability of the post-
employment restraint is based on the reasonableness of the restraint in relation 
to the employer’s interests, the employee’s interests, the interests of consumers, 
and the interests of the public.129   
The typical approach of Japanese courts in assessing the reasonableness of 
a post-employment non-compete clause is to determine the reasonableness of 
the restraint in respect of its time limit, geographical application, the type of 
business it restricts and whether the employee was paid for agreeing to the re-
straint.130  Importantly, Japanese courts have held that consent by an employee 
to enter a non-compete clause is not conclusive evidence of a restrictive cove-
nant’s enforceability.  In addition to being reasonable, Japanese courts have held 
that the restraint must not be more restrictive than necessary, the process to cre-
ate the agreement must be adequate, and consideration is required to counter-
balance the effect of the restraint.131  
Thus, Japanese courts are likely to review the collective bargaining process 
                                                 
126. Labor Union Act, art. 7(ii). 
127. FINKIN, ET AL., supra note 48, at 84. 
128. Nara Chihō Saibansho [Nara Dist. Ct.], Oct. 23, 1970, 624 HANJI 78 (Japan) [hereinafter Fo-
seco Japan Case]. 
129.  See id. at 82. 
130. Takashi Araki, Legal Issues of Employee Loyalty in Japan, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 267, 
276 (1999). 
131. Urawa Chihō Saibansho [Urawa Dist. Ct.] Jan. 27, 1997, 1618 HANJI 115, 118 (Japan) [here-
inafter Tōkyō Freight Car Case]. 
KAWAI-NICHOL ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/06/2015  4:03 PM 
2015]        LABOR IN NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL  515 
in order to assess the reasonableness of the restraints imposed by the free agent 
system.  The free agent system has been the subject of several rounds of collec-
tive bargaining since its introduction in 1993.  As discussed above, collective 
bargaining has seen the length of service required to become a free agent re-
duced from ten years to nine years, and now, a dual system of domestic and 
international free agency operates.  Players can move to another NPB club after 
seven or eight years of service, depending on their draft status.  The current 
domestic system represents a significant reduction in service from the initial ten 
years of service and a slight reduction for the nine years of service to become 
an international free agent.  Several rounds of collective bargaining demonstrate 
the willingness and bona fide intentions of NPB in negotiating the free agent 
system that, when combined with the policy of competitive balance,132 indicates 
that Japanese courts are likely to respect the autonomy of NPB’s internal labor 
system and view free agency as a reasonable restraint.  However, NPB lacks the 
authority to govern the transfer of players to foreign clubs.  A strong argument 
exists that international free agency does not operate in isolation, that it is now 
intrinsically linked to the posting of players to major league clubs.  
D.  The Posting System, Restraint of Trade and Japanese Labor Law 
If a Japanese court adopted the position that free agency and the posting 
system are interconnected and viewed the posting system as a work rule, the 
enforceability of the new posting system would be contingent upon the qualifi-
cation period to become an international free agent.  The relevant judicial test 
focuses on whether the process to create the work rule and its content is unen-
forceable on the basis that it denies an individual their freedom.133  This judicial 
concept of reasonableness identifies if the employer unilaterally created the new 
work rule, or if the explicit consent of employees or their labor union was ob-
tained.  The content of the amendment is assessed based on the level of disad-
vantage created for employees, the ability of the amendment to protect the em-
ployer’s interests, the existence of good cause to make the amendment, the 
process of negotiation between management and workers, and any other rele-
vant considerations.134  To determine if the new posting system satisfies the el-
ements of the test of reasonableness, it is necessary to identify and apply the 
relevant judicial standard.  
                                                 
132. See Andrew Zimbalist, Reflections on Salary Shares and Salary Caps, 11 J. SPORTS ECON. 17 
(2010). 
133. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Feb. 28, 1997, 705 MINSHŪ 51 (Japan) (hereinafter Daishi Bank 
Case). 
134. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Oct. 16, 1995, 690 RŌDŌ HANREI 75 (Japan) (here-
inafter Tōkyō Legal Mind Case). 
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In determining the relevant judicial standard, a Japanese court is likely to 
use cases that apply the Labor Standards Act and the Labor Contract Act, even 
though these laws do not govern the labor of NPB players.  The reason is that 
the issues raised in general labor disputes involve analogous issues to those 
raised by the introduction of the new posting protocols.  According to the Labor 
Standards Act, work rules must be in writing for employers who continuously 
employ ten or more workers.135  NPB clubs maintain a roster of a maximum of 
seventy players, and the posting system is contained in the 2013 Posting Agree-
ment.  Further, to change a work rule, the Labor Contract Act requires employ-
ees to be consulted136 and the Labor Standards Act for employers to obtain the 
opinion of a majority of employees.137  However, an employer is not required to 
obtain the consent of employees to change work rules, and courts apply the prin-
ciple of good faith to determine if the alteration to the work rule was reasonable.  
To prove the new posting system is a reasonable change to a work rule, NPB 
would need to demonstrate the new protocols are a product of good faith nego-
tiations with the JPBPA.  Publicly available information helps to assess the rea-
sonableness of what were confidential negotiations.  NPB notified the JPBPA 
of MLB’s decision to change the posting system, and sought the approval of the 
union when MLB submitted the two proposed posting systems.138  The JPBPA 
then sought feedback from player representatives from all twelve clubs,139 and 
as discussed earlier, the JPBPA was permitted to voice its concerns regarding 
the old posting system.  Overall, NPB players will benefit from the new posting 
system in that they can negotiate with multiple clubs; the cap on release fees 
encourages more MLB clubs to bid, and as demonstrated by the Tanaka con-
tract, allows a player to receive a greater percentage of his market value.   
These factors indicate that the changes to the posting protocols involve the 
amendment of a work rule that was reasonable, and the result of good faith ne-
gotiations.  Therefore, there is a high probability that Japanese courts would 
allow NPB clubs to retain discretion over when reserved players move to for-
eign leagues.  Alternatively, if the nine years of service were held by a Japanese 
court to be unreasonable, the only legal mechanism available to NPB clubs to 
retain reserved players wanting to embark on a MLB career would be to enter 
long-term contracts.  
                                                 
135. Labor Standards Act, art. 89.  
136. Labor Contract Act, art. 10. 
137. Labor Standards Act, art. 90. 
138. See Nichibei shinyū, supra note 97. 
139. Nippon puro yakyū, sensyukai kyou shinseido ketsuron [JPBPA Will Conclude If They Accept 
the New Posting System Today], ZAKZAK (Japan) (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://www.zakzak.co.jp/sports/baseball/news/20131113/bbl1311131204007-n1.htm. 
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E.  Nippon Professional Baseball’s Transfer System and Japanese 
Competition Law 
The historical development of competition law in Japan, as well as econom-
ics, culture, and the Japanese legal system, shape the operation and enforcement 
of the Antimonopoly Act, but are sometimes ignored in comparative analyses of 
the NPB transfer system.140  While the general aim of the competition law sys-
tem established by the Sherman Act of 1890141 is to promote free competition 
in the economy by prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade and monopolies, 
competition law was introduced to the Japanese legal system during the Occu-
pation in 1947.  The Antimonopoly Act was part of the law reform agenda aimed 
at democratizing Japan and Japanese corporations,142 but during the ensuing 
decades of the bubble economy, Japanese consumers, businesses, and the gov-
ernment rarely utilised the Antimonopoly Act. 
The dramatic bursting of the bubble economy and the resulting economic 
problems changed this paradigm, and the 1990s sparked a broad social and cor-
porate legislative reform agenda that would last for nearly 20 years.143  Part of 
this agenda included a shift in competition policy by the Japanese government 
in 1991,144 resulting in greater enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act by the Ja-
pan Fair Trade Commission.145  The general purpose of the Antimonopoly Act 
is to promote the democratic development of the economy and the interests of 
consumers by prohibiting private monopolization, unreasonable restraints of 
trade and unfair trade practices.  The Act also attempts to “prevent[] excessive 
concentration of economic power and eliminate unreasonable restraint[s] . . . 
and . . . restriction[s] on business activit[y] . . . .146 
Even though the Japanese courts have never been utilized to challenge the 
                                                 
140. Ross Appel, Head East, Young Man (and Comparatively Older Men Who Are Likely to Lan-
guish in the Minor Leagues), 12 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 109, at 112–16 (2010); Siesta, supra note 
78, at 1089–1091. 
141. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
142. These efforts culminated in 1946 with the Japanese Constitution, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] 
[THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] (1946), and revisions by Illinois lawyers to Japan’s corporate law, 
SHŌHŌ [SHŌHŌ] (Comm. C.) 1899, amended by Law No. 167, 1950 (Japan). 
143. Matt Nichol, Japanese Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Information Dis-
closure: What is the Role of Private Rights Enforcement?, 27 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 262, 264 (2013). 
144. From 1989 to the early 1990s, the Japanese government also experienced external reform pres-
sure from the United States government, who wanted the Antimonopoly Act enforced so that American 
corporations could enter Japan and help correct the trade imbalance.  Mel Marquis & Tadashi Shiraishi, 
Japanese Cartel Control in Transition 6–9 (CEU Ediciones, Working Paper No. 14, 2014). 
145. General enforcement measures that are now used include cease and desist orders, fines, injunc-
tions and awards of damages.  Disputes can be heard by a panel of the Fair Trade Commission panel 
and can proceed to the Tōkyō High Court.  See JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 116. 
146. Antimonopoly Act, art. 1. 
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legality of NPB’s labor practices, players, the JPBPA, or another party could 
contest the legality of NPB’s domestic and international transfer systems using 
the Antimonopoly Act.  Article 3 of the Antimonopoly Act prohibits entrepre-
neurs from effecting private monopolization and unreasonable restraints of 
trade,147 the functional equivalent to Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.148  
Japanese competition law also prohibits international agreements or contracts 
entered into by entrepreneurs that create an unreasonable restraint of trade.149  
Therefore, NPB’s free agent and posting systems will be enforceable under Jap-
anese competition law if the relevant rules contained in the 2013 NPB Basic 
Agreement, the Rule of Free Agency, and the 2013 Posting Agreement do not 
give effect to a private monopoly or an unreasonable restraint of trade.   
Proving free agency and posting constitute a private monopolization under 
the Antimonopoly Act would be difficult.  It can be argued that by creating in-
ternational free agency and the posting system, the NPB 2013 Basic Agreement, 
the Rule of Free Agency, and the 2013 Posting Agreement “exclude[] or con-
trol[] the business activities of other entrepreneurs”150 in relation to the employ-
ment of professional Japanese baseball players in Japan and the United States, 
but to breach the Antimonopoly Act, the restraint of competition created by 
these agreements must be contrary to the public interest.151  Herein lies the prob-
lem.  The NPB and its clubs would argue that the reserve and free agent system 
represent standard practice in professional baseball and professional sport that 
protects Japan’s public interest in baseball and its professional clubs by promot-
ing competitive balance in the nation’s premier professional sports league and 
controlling the loss of talented players to foreign leagues.   
Another option under the Antimonopoly Act is to claim that the agreements 
that establish free agency and the posting systems are an unreasonable restraints 
of trade in that they are collusive agreements between entrepreneurs that mutu-
ally restrict their business activities in regards to the cost and availability of 
labor in the provision of professional baseball games.152  An unreasonable re-
                                                 
147. Id. art. 3. 
148. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  This legislation formed the basis of antitrust 
litigation in American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 16 (Sup. Ct. 1914), Fed. Baseball 
Club v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson v. New York Yankees, 
346 U.S. 356 (1953), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).  These cases resulted in the famous 
judicial exemption of MLB from antitrust laws, an exemption that was partially repealed by the Curt 
Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27(a) (2012).  
149. Antimonopoly Act, art. 6. 
150. Id. art. 2(5). 
151. Id. 
152. See id. art. 2(6). 
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straint of trade must be contrary to public interest and substantially restrain com-
petition,153 which allows the application of the same arguments that the monop-
olization created by the free agent and posting systems are in the public interest.  
In the context of unreasonable restraints of trade, the public interest test creates 
a risk for the JPBPA and its members.  NPB could strategically argue, or 
threaten to argue, that the reserve and free agent systems operate in tandem with 
the league’s restriction on foreign players to ensure NPB retains its ‘Japanese’ 
qualities, and that Japanese players can work in Japan’s premier professional 
sporting league.  Such an argument exposes the foreign player restriction to the 
risk of being held invalid on the basis of unreasonably restraining the trade of 
foreign professional players, in turn exposing the active rosters of NPB clubs to 
increased levels of foreign players and fewer jobs for Japanese players.  
V.  THE FUTURE OF NIPPON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL’S INTERNATIONAL 
PLAYER TRANSFER SYSTEM 
The new posting agreement will be tested in three posting periods prior to 
its formal expiry on December 15, 2016.  The first posting period saw the trans-
fer of Tanaka in 2013, and greater insight into the new system will be likely 
obtained by the likely posting of another ace pitcher, Maeda Kenta, at the end 
of the 2015 season.154  The JPBPA is likely to push for further reforms from late 
2015, as may MLB and NPB clubs, depending on the outcome of any postings 
in 2015.  This Article will now conclude by proposing a number of reforms that 
should be part of future dialogue regarding the posting system.155  In addition, 
Part V will also analyse whether the issues raised in this Article are part of a 
larger regulatory issue; namely, the need for a global player transfer system in 
baseball.  
A.  Areas of Reform for the Posting System 
The end of the term of the 2013 Posting Agreement in December 2016 will 
allow the expansion of potential reforms at the next round of bargaining.  Major 
                                                 
153. Id. 
154. Maeda, a right-handed, twenty-five-year-old starting pitcher for the Toyo Hiroshima Carp, won 
the Sawamura Award in 2010, equivalent to the Cy Young Award, was scouted by MLB clubs at the 
2013 World Baseball Classic, and has publicly stated his intention to play in the major leagues.  Dayn 
Perry, Kenta Maeda: The Next Big NPB Export Now That Tanaka Has Signed?, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 23, 
2014), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-on-baseball/24418251/kenta-maeda-the-next-big-nbp-ex-
port-now-that-tanaka-has-signed. 
155. The formal end date of the current Posting Agreement is important in light of the fact that, at 
this time, a new group of elite pitchers will be approaching posting eligibility, including Kikuchi Yusei, 
Ōtani Shohei (signed as a pitcher and outfielder), and Fujinami Shintaro. 
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structural changes or a new transfer framework are unlikely, but two major is-
sues need to become part of the debate on the future of the international transfer 
of Japanese players.  Both the 2000 and 2013 versions of the Posting Agreement 
have narrowly focused on the transfer of established ichi-gun players, who rep-
resent a small percentage of the workforce in the NPB.  A major policy shift in 
the Posting Agreement would be to expand the posting system to include players 
who are unable to secure a regular position on the active roster and are career 
ni-gun players.156  The cost for MLB clubs to acquire such players would be 
low.   For NPB clubs, lower valued but loyal players with significant ni-gun 
service would be given the opportunity to extend their career in the larger labor 
market of the minor and major leagues. 
Another area for major reform is the transfer of amateur Japanese players 
to MLB clubs.  Even though the Japan High School Baseball Federation and the 
Japan Amateur Baseball Association (JABA) are directly responsible for the 
recruitment of amateurs by all professional clubs,157 recent events demonstrate 
the need for a formal protocol to replace the existing informal “gentlemen’s 
agreement.”158  The hysterical reaction in NPB by the Boston Red Sox breaching 
this agreement and recruiting industrial league player Tazawa Junichi in 2008159 
was repeated by the failed attempts of MLB clubs to recruit two of Japanese 
baseball’s best high school pitching prospects, Kikuchi Yusei in 2009160 and 
Ōtani Shoei in 2012.161  The steady stream of problematic amateur transfers 
                                                 
156. Many of these players would not be prepared to take a large pay cut to play in the minor 
leagues, nor deal with the challenges of speaking English and a new culture.  But the opportunity to 
play in the major leagues would appeal to a number of players with limited opportunities to play ichi-
gun. 
157. See generally JAPAN HIGH SCHOOL BASEBALL FEDERATION, KOUTO UGAKKOU 
YAKYUUBUIN NO PURO YAKYUUDAN TONO KANKEI NI TUITENO KITEI [REGULATION ON 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIGH SCHOOL BASEBALL PLAYERS AND PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL TEAMS] 
(1968, amended 2005); JAPAN STUDENT BASEBALL ASSOCIATION, NIHON GAKUSEI YAKYUU 
KENSHOU (ZENMEN KAITEI) [JAPAN STUDENT BASEBALL CHARTER] (2010). 
158. The informal agreement between MLB and the NPB prevents MLB clubs from recruiting top 
amateur Japanese talent considered to be NPB prospects. If prospects are not selected in the NPB draft, 
they may sign with a MLB club. Shirō Yamaguchi & Shiori Tabuchi, Niti? Bei? Ōtani Doko He 25 Niti 
Puro Yakyū Dorahuto Kaigi [Where is Ōtani Going, Japan or US?  Draft Will Be Held on Oct. 25], 
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Osaka), Oct. 4, 2012, at 18.  This agreement excludes players like Tazawa who 
requested not to be drafted after nominating for the draft.  Ōtani nominated for the draft then stated he 
wanted to pursue a MLB career but did not state that he did not want to be drafted, and after being 
drafted by the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles, changed his mind once again and signed with the 
Golden Eagles. 
159. Kawai & Nichol, supra note 3, at 187–89. 
160. Stuart Biggs, Japan Teen’s 94-mph Fastball May Spur U.S. Migration, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 
2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a.X6E.DD0.XI. 
161. Ryōji Yoshimura, Hanamakihigasikou Ōtani Tousyu ‘Wakai Utikara Ikitai’ Mejya- Chousen 
Wo Hyoumei [Ōtani’s Desire: I Want to Go to MLB When I Am Still Young], THE ASHAHI SHIBUN 
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continued in 2013 when the Los Angeles Dodgers signed industrial league 
pitcher Numata Takumi to a minor league contract, violating the JABA’s rules 
and procedures,162 and resulting in Numata receiving a life ban from playing in 
the industrial leagues.  In addition, the JABA requested the NPB to contact MLB 
and request that major league clubs follow JABA rules in recruiting industrial 
league players.163 
The focus of reforms in future posting system negotiations will be on the 
form of current posting protocols.  The calculation of transfer fees for posted 
players will continue to be a major issue and will be analysed in detail below.  
The JPBPA is likely to push the NPB to expand the right of posted players to 
negotiate with multiple MLB clubs, an important right for players that do not 
attract the attention of players like Tanaka or Darvish, and a right that is cur-
rently contingent on more than one club agreeing to pay the release fee.  Another 
normative problem not addressed by the 2013 reforms involves posted players 
who attract no bids or do not agree to a contract with a MLB club.  We propose 
that in both circumstances such players obtain the consent of their club to be-
come a designated free agent for a restricted period, for example thirty days, 
during which time the player could negotiate with all MLB clubs.  In the event 
the player does not enter a contract with a major league club, he would return to 
his NPB club.  The release fee for these transfers would be a percentage of the 
value of the player’s final contract in the NPB, reflecting the NPB’s valuation 
of the player.  A designated free agent system would create an incentive for 
clubs who agree to pay the release fee to negotiate a contract with the player, 
and could be complimented by penalizing such clubs if a posted player does not 
enter a contract.  Potential penalties include prohibition from participating in 
future posting periods or monetary fines that could be distributed between the 
player, his NPB club, and MLB clubs not involved in contract negotiations.  
Even though the ability of multiple teams to negotiate with a posted player in 
effect negates the ability of a MLB club to block a Japanese player from trans-
ferring to a rival club, these reforms would allay any lingering doubts about the 
                                                 
(Osaka), Oct. 22, 2012, at 14; Keiko Tomishige, Netemo Sametemo: Ayamaranakute Ii [All the Time: 
You Don’t Have to Apologize], MAINICHI SHIMBUN EVENING PAPER (Tōkyō), Dec. 13, 2012, at 2. 
162. Prior to signing a professional contract, industrial league players must be removed from the 
JABA registry of players so that players do not simultaneously possess amateur and professional status.  
This did not occur and neither the Dodgers nor Numata obtained permission from his club, the Edion 
Aiko-dai Ob Blitz, to contact each other.  As a registered player, Numata was required to contract 
exclusively with his industrial league club for a period of three years (two years for college players). 
JABA, TOUROKU KITEI [RULE OF REGISTRATION] (1991, amended 2009), art. 15. 
163. Numata Mondai: Genbatsu Wo Motte Saihatsu Boushi Wo Hakaru [Numata Problem: Preven-
tive Step Taken With Severe Punishment], NIKKAN SPORTS (Tōkyō) (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nik-
kansports.com/baseball/news/f-bb-tp3-20130926-1195463.html. 
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motivations of MLB clubs.164 
B.  The Posting System and the Calculation of the Transfer Fee 
Prior to examining methods of calculating the release fee, it is necessary to 
identify the factors relevant to calculating a transfer fee.  Player transfers typi-
cally involve two losses that can be assigned a dollar value—the effect of the 
loss on the performance of the team and the cost of developing the player.  Soc-
cer’s global player transfer system165 incorporates both financial costs, and the 
impact on the team of losing a contracted player requires the payment by the 
new club to the player’s previous club of a “solidarity contribution,” financial 
compensation that is calculated as percentage of the player’s new contract.166  
Soccer’s transfer system also requires a player’s new club to pay “training com-
pensation” to the player’s previous clubs when the player signs his first profes-
sional contract and on all other professional transfers until the player is twenty-
three years old.167  The restriction on the payment of the training compensation 
reflects Nakazato and Ramseyer’s research on the repayment of development 
costs by NPB, and the fact that established professional players generally re-
quire a minimal amount of training compared to less experienced players.  
Therefore, the release fee of posted players should not include training compen-
sation as most posted players have completed a minimum of seven years of ichi-
gun service and are at least twenty-five years old. 
The aim of calculating the transfer fee in the new posting system needs to 
be on accurately valuing the on-field loss of the player, an important consider-
ation in light of the NPB club now setting the release fee.  Over the years a 
number of methods to calculate the posting system’s transfer fee have been pro-
posed.  Stephen R. Rosner and William T. Conroy identified a number of these 
proposals, including: a flat fee paid by MLB to the NPB for Japanese players 
participating in the MLB draft; a per-player fee that is negotiated by the two 
leagues and based on the selection of Japanese players in an international draft; 
a uniform per player fee; and a uniform player fee with uniform fee classes 
                                                 
164. See Gould, supra note 53, at 27. 
165. See generally FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, REGULATIONS ON 
THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (2003) [hereinafter FIFA REGULATIONS].  See generally 
Stratis Camatsos, European Sports, the Transfer System and Competition Law: Will They Ever Find a 
Competitive Balance?, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 155 (2005). 
166. The amount of the transfer fee is five percent of the player’s new contract and is distributed on 
a pro rata basis to the player’s teams when aged between twelve and twenty-three years.  See FIFA 
REGULATIONS, supra note 165, art. 1. 
167. Id. art. 20. Training costs are based on the costs the new club would have incurred if they 
trained the player.  Id. art. 4–5. 
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based on a player’s skill and experience.168  However, these proposals involve 
NPB clubs losing control of reserved players and lower transfer fees than pro-
duced by either of the posting systems and are unlikely to receive support from 
the NPB or its clubs. 
Our proposal for calculating the release fee involves adapting the principle 
of the solidarity contribution and Rosner and Conroy’s percentage transfer sys-
tem169 to calculate a release fee that recognizes NPB’s reserve system and gen-
eral labor practices.  The basis of the release fee would be the Japanese player’s 
new MLB contract and the NPB club’s compensation scaled according to the 
number of years required by a player to qualify as an international free agent.  
For example, the scale could be set at 400 percent of the salary one year before 
qualification, 600 percent for two years, 800 percent for three years, and so on.  
Using the player’s MLB contract and the number of years remaining until inter-
national free agency to calculate is advantageous in that it includes the perspec-
tive of the NPB and MLB club, would promote consistency in setting release 
fees, and intersects with NPB’s concept of fair compensation.  An alternative 
method of calculation is setting the transfer fee at fixed percentages of a con-
tract.  One option is to rank the player’s final salary at his Japanese club, a sys-
tem that is used to calculate compensation in NPB’s domestic free agent sys-
tem.170  Another option is to calculate the transfer fee as a fixed percentage of 
the player’s MLB contract, or set a scale of percentages based on salary ranges.   
C.  Professional Baseball’s Global Labor Market 
The movement of professional Japanese players to the major leagues is part 
of a broader global movement of baseball players, a trend driven by MLB’s 
policy of globalisation171 through the international expansion of MLB’s talent 
                                                 
168. Rosner & Conroy, supra note 7, at 119–127. 
169. See id. at 125–26. 
170. RULE OF FREE AGENT, supra note 34, art. 10.  This system determines free agency compensa-
tion based on: 
“A rank” players were in a team’s top three players for salary and compensation is either 
money (80 percent of the player’s last salary) or money (50 percent of player’s salary) and 
one unprotected player.  
 
“B rank” players were in a team’s top four to ten salary earners and compensation is either 
money (60 percent of the player’s last salary) or money (40 percent of player’s salary) and 
one unprotected player.  
 
“C rank” players are all other players and teams receive no compensation for these players. 
 
171. Major League Baseball International was established to implement this policy.  See generally 
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pool and revenues.172  Highlighting the globalisation of baseball’s workforce is 
the diversity of major and minor league teams.  By 2012, twenty-eight percent 
of major league players and forty-six percent of minor league players were born 
outside the United States.173  Aiding the globalisation of the baseball workforce 
are MLB’s initiatives, which include the establishment of the World Baseball 
Classic174 (WBC) foreign countries hosting the MLB season opening series,175 
the establishment and financial support of foreign baseball academies,176 formal 
agreements with foreign leagues to govern player transfers,177 and the creation 
of the Australian Baseball League, a new winter league.178  In addition to NPB 
and MLB’s network of major and minor leagues, the global labor market of 
professional baseball players now includes professionals from the Mexican Pa-
cific League, Dominican Winter League, Venezuelan Winter League, Korean 
Baseball Organisation (KBO) Chinese Professional Baseball League (Taiwan), 
Chinese Baseball League, Asia Winter League, and Australian Baseball League.  
The recruitment activities of many players in baseball’s global labor market 
have led to problems in the activities of clubs in foreign countries, as evidenced 
by the Tazawa transfer and a similar event in 2012 that saw the Baltimore Ori-
oles banned from scouting amateurs in South Korea.179  However, the race 
                                                 
Major League Baseball International, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/international/mlbi_index.jsp (last 
visited May 11, 2015). 
172. William B. Gould IV, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played and Heard and Watched 
'Round the World (with Apologies to Soccer and Bobby Thomson), 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 
86–88 (2000); Gould, supra note 55, at 15; Alan Klein, Globalizing Sport: Assessing the World Base-
ball Classic, 9 SOCCER & SOC’Y 158, 159 (2008). 
173. Percentage of Foreign Players Rises, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/7779279/per-
centage-foreign-major-league-baseball-players-rises (last updated Apr. 5, 2012).  Players in the major 
and minor leagues are now recruited from countries including the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, 
Puerto Rico, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, Aruba, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Tai-
wan, Italy, Germany, Curacao, New Zealand, and Australia. 
174. The World Baseball Classic Inc. is a joint venture equally owned by MLB and the MLBPA.  
175. MLB has had it season opening series in Mexico, Puerto Rico, Japan, and Australia.  
176. MLB operates development academies in Latin America, Australia, Italy, and China.  Major 
League Baseball Australia Academy, BASEBALL AUSTRL., http://www.baseball.com.au/Profes-
sional/Pathways-to-Pro-Ball/MLB-Australia-Academy (last visited May 11, 2015). 
177. These agreements are with the Mexican League, Korean Professional Baseball League, NPB, 
and Chinese Professional Baseball League.  2012 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 27, att. 46, sec. 
I(E)(1–2). 
178. The Australian Baseball League is a joint venture; seventy-five percent is owned by MLB and 
twenty-five percent by the Australian Baseball Federation.  Ryan P. Morrison, What’s Next for the 
Australian Baseball League?, BEYOND THE BOX SCORE (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.beyondthebox-
score.com/2014/1/31/5358328/mlb-australia-dodgers-diamondbacks-abl. 
179. The Orioles signed high school pitching prospect Kim Seong-min prior to entering his final 
year of high school, violating the Korean Baseball Association’s rules that prevent any professional 
clubs from contacting players before their final year of school.  The Orioles were banned from attending 
all amateur high school and college games in South Korea.  Seong-min was banned from playing or 
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among MLB clubs to find cheap international talent has seen recruitment prac-
tices in many Latin American countries push the boundaries of ethical and re-
sponsible conduct.  The practices of major league clubs in the Dominican Re-
public have attracted much criticism and can involve the recruitment of players 
as young as sixteen years of age for a few thousand dollars and signing bonuses 
that can be grossly disproportionate to players of similar talent in the United 
States.  In addition, money from signing bonuses is sometimes skimmed by 
player agents (buscone) and club representatives.  Dominican players then enter 
local academies operated by MLB and its clubs and a small number are selected 
to play in the minor leagues.  Criminal activity does occur, and there have been 
cases of identity theft and fraudulent paperwork proving age.180  Then, there are 
legal, political, and ethical issues related to the defection of Cuban players.181  
D.  Governing Professional Baseball’s Global Labor Market 
Amid the gradual growth of baseball’s global presence operates a decentred 
system of regulation that has contributed to the problems experienced in Latin 
America, Japan, South Korea, and other parts of the world.  Inside this regula-
tory paradigm exists a fragmented global player transfer system that consists of 
a mix of formal and informal arrangements, agreements between professional 
leagues, agreements between professional clubs from different countries, and 
agreements between professional leagues and national baseball federations.  
This fragmented system is largely the result of the absence of an independent 
global regulator, a regulatory gap filled by a number of regulatory actors who 
perform narrow elements of the regulatory functions of a global regulator.   
The peak international body in baseball is the International Baseball Feder-
ation (IBF), who is primarily responsible for organizing international competi-
tions and promoting grassroots baseball, not governing the movement of players 
to professional clubs.  Baseball’s omission from the Olympics led to the recent 
creation in 2012 of the World Baseball Softball Confederation (WSBC), a lobby 
                                                 
coaching in high school or college and has not been signed by any KBO or MLB clubs.  Local Baseball 
Governing Body Bans Baltimore's Scouts After Controversial Signing, YONHAP NEWS (Seoul) (Feb. 9, 
2012),             http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/cul-
turesports/2012/02/09/93/0702000000AEN20120209006100315F.HTML. 
180. Gould, supra note 53, at 18–19. 
181. The extraordinary risk taken by Cuban players to play major-league baseball was demonstrated 
by Los Angeles Dodgers’ outfielder, Yasuiel Puig.  It has been confirmed that Puig and three other 
people were smuggled out of Cuba by a Mexican drug cartel, employed by a Miami businessman, who 
refused to pay the agreed fee.  The cartel never received their money, and they have since threatened 
Puig’s life.  The Miami businessman is also seeking money for Puig’s arrival in the United States.  For 
the full story of Puig’s journey to the Dodgers, see Jesse Katz, Escape from Cuba: Yasuiel Puig’s 
Untold Journey to the Dodgers, L.A. MAG. (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.lamag.com/fea-
tures/2014/04/13/escape-from-cuba-yasiel-puigs-untold-journey-to-the-dodgers/page/1. 
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group representing baseball and softball in their effort to be reinstated to the 
Olympic program.182  Meanwhile, the World Baseball Classic Inc. and its steer-
ing committee operate baseball’s premier international event, the World Base-
ball Classic or WBC, an event that every four years sees professional players 
from all of the world’s professional leagues competing for their country.  Since 
the first WBC in 2006, the ownership of this competition by MLB has brought 
to the surface many of tensions created by the absence of a global regulator and 
MLB’s dominant presence as a global regulator.  Gould identified a number of 
transparency issues, including host venues for qualifying rounds and finals, ap-
pointment of umpires, and pitch limit rules.183  Many of the early governance 
issues emanated from NPB and KBO fears of American imperialism, and the 
lack of fairness and democratic representation in the management of the tour-
naments.  These concerns were partly addressed by NPB and KBO gaining po-
sitions on the steering committees for the 2009 and 2013 tournaments.184  Other 
issues in Japan have included revenue distribution185 and the absence of Japa-
nese major league players on Team Japan at the 2013 WBC.186 
E.  Major League Baseball as a Global Regulator in Labor 
The global regulation of baseball labor is dominated by MLB and its regu-
latory activities now extend beyond private agreements with other professional 
                                                 
182. In September 2013, the joint bid by baseball and softball was one of three finalists vying for 
reinstatement.  But the WSBC was unsuccessful in their efforts to have baseball reinstated for the Tōkyō 
Olympics in 2020 and wrestling was instead reinstated.  Joey Nowak, Baseball Will Not Be Reinstated 
for 2020 Olympics, MLB.COM (Sept. 8, 2013), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/arti-
cle.jsp?ymd=20130908&content_id=59954638&vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb. 
183. Gould, supra note 53, at 35–36. 
184. After the 2006 WBC, the NPB and KBO utilized their political power to gain representation 
on the WBC Steering Committee for the 2009 and 2013 tournaments.  See 2013 World Baseball Classic 
Field Expands to 28 Teams, INT’L BASEBALL FED’N (June 1, 2011), 
http://www.ibaf.org/en/news/2011/06/01/2013-world-baseball-classic-field-expands-to-28-
te/7c72c2b7-5ea7-4c51-9c79-25ecc4b05123. 
185. The distribution of revenue caused issues due to Japan’s significant contribution to revenues 
through sponsorship, gate receipts, and television rights.  The NPB and JPBPA were involved in pro-
tracted disputes with MLB prior to the 2013 WBC.  Associated Press, Japan Agrees to Play in 2013 
WBC, ESPN (Sept. 4, 2012), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/8335634/japan-commits-2013-world-
baseball-classic.  It was reported that for the 2013 WBC, forty-seven percent of profits were distributed 
among teams as prize money. The remaining fifty-three percent of profits were distributed among mem-
bers of the steering committee: MLB seventeen and one-half percent, MLBPA seventeen and one-half 
percent, NPB seven percent, KBO five percent, and the IBAF five percent.  FURŪCHI YOSHIAKI, MAJOR 
LEAGUE NO WBC SEKAI SENRYAKU [MAJOR LEAGUE’S WBC WORLD STRATEGY] 34 (2009). 
186. Transparency and a fair, level playing field at the WBC is influenced by MLB clubs, who 
determine the availability of a nation’s major and minor league players, a practice that is in contrast to 
soccer’s system of national representation.  See FIFA REGULATIONS, supra note 165, art. 1. 
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leagues to encompass the recruitment of international amateurs.187  The 2012 
Basic Agreement required the establishment of the International Talent Com-
mittee (ITC) to explore the introduction of an international amateur draft, and 
in the interim, implemented a taxation system for recruiting international ama-
teurs.188  Established in December 2011, the primary objective of the ITC is to 
examine the acquisition and development of international players by proposing 
rules for regulating the recruitment of international professional players and 
how to implement an international amateur draft.189  Reflective of many of the 
issues discussed above, matters to be investigated by the ITC include the appro-
priate minimum age for international amateurs signing professional contracts, 
the inclusion of international amateurs in international draft or the MLB amateur 
draft, safeguards for signing bonuses paid to international amateurs, representa-
tion of international amateurs, the effect of local law in countries where inter-
national players are recruited and whether protocols with professional leagues 
like the Mexican League and  NPB require amendments to facilitate an interna-
tional draft.190   
The emphasis of the current MLB Basic Agreement on an international am-
ateur draft and a taxation system are evidence of the direction MLB intends to 
steer the regulation of baseball’s global labor market.  Resistance by MLB clubs 
to an international draft saw the failure to meet the deadline required to com-
mence the international draft,191 an outcome connected to the investment by 
clubs in in foreign academies192 and the strategic advantages created for clubs 
with sophisticated international scouting systems.  Even though the interna-
tional draft was delayed until the next collective bargaining period, another 
model of regulation began in July 2013 when MLB formally commenced regu-
lating the recruitment of international amateurs through its signing bonus-taxa-
tion system.  The new system created three new regulatory mechanisms.  First, 
there is now an international signing period from July 2nd to June 15th of the 
following year.193  Second, MLB clubs are allocated a signing bonus pool for 
                                                 
187. International players are residents of any country or territory, other than the United States, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico.  2012 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 27, att. 46, sec. II(E)(1). 
188. 2012 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 27, att. 46, sec. I–II.  The failure to implement an 
international draft by 2014 resulted in the introduction of the taxation system and was described by 
Gould as a type of “poison pill.”  Gould, supra note 53, at 19. 
189. 2012 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 78, att. 46, sec. I(A). 
190. Id. att. 46(I)(D). 
191. Id. art. 46, sec. II(E).  In May 2013, MLB announced that an international draft would not be 
introduced in 2014, as no agreement with the MLBPA had been reached.  Jay Jaffe, No International 
Draft for 2014, or Anytime Soon, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 31, 2013), 
http://mlb.si.com/2013/05/31/mlb-international-draft-2014/.  
192. Gould, supra note 53, at 30. 
193. 2012 MLB BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 27, art. 46, sec. II(B). 
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each signing period.194  Third, teams that exceed their allocated pool are taxed 
on the amount they exceed their pool and also face future restrictions on the 
value of signing bonuses for international players.195   
F.  Is There a Need for a Global Player Transfer System in Baseball? 
The gradual movement of baseball to a global sport has created a burgeon-
ing global market for baseball labor of amateur recruits and professional play-
ers.  Transfers from the NPB to MLB over the past two decades highlight the 
difficulties encountered by professional leagues administering privately negoti-
ated transfer rules.  Even greater challenges exist in the regulation of recruiting 
amateur players in regions like Latin America.  Currently, the dual regulatory 
systems for amateur and professional players represent an embryonic model of 
regulation, devoid of a clear and transparent set of rules, and an independent 
regulator, two essential requirements for the operation of an effective global 
system.  The growth in the number of people seeking work as professional play-
ers will continue to grow in response to the global promotion and development 
of baseball.  A global framework of transfer rules and procedures is needed to 
support a global labor market. 
The starting point for creating a basic global player transfer system is setting 
clear time periods for the recruitment and release of players in professional 
leagues.  Such a system would allow players time to seek work in the same 
league, or in a foreign league, and could incorporate a notice system to make 
foreign leagues aware of released players.  The details of players released during 
a season could also be included in a notice system.  Another regulatory mecha-
nism required in a global labor market is a formal dispute resolution mechanism, 
particularly important for players at risk of unscrupulous practices by agents 
and clubs, and disputes arising from players transferring between leagues.  A 
global transfer framework could also set out the availability of professional 
players for national representation.  These proposals are moderate and would 
not lead to the substantial reduction in power by MLB or the NPB, but would 
allow the smoother international transfer of players and establish a foundation 
to introduce a global system of rules and procedures.  However, the problems 
associated to MLB’s ownership of the WBC highlights the need for transpar-
ency and fairness in the world of global baseball.  The absence of an independ-
ent regulator will continue to inhibit the birth of a global player transfer system.  
                                                 
194. The base signing pool for the 2012–2013 signing period was $2.9 million but subsequent sign-
ing periods are based on the reverse order of winning percentage from the previous season and calcu-
lated by assigning four bonus values to each club and adding $400,000 to the aggregate sum.  Id. art. 
46, sec. II(A). 
195. Id. art. 46, sec. II(C). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The one certainty of the future transfer of Japanese players from the NPB 
to MLB is that the Japanese professional system will continue to produce elite 
young pitchers who create a recruiting frenzy among MLB clubs, a frenzy 
fuelled by the search for the next Darvish or Tanaka.  The new posting system 
will face its next test with the pending posting of Maeda, an important transfer, 
that in addition to the posting of Tanaka, will shape negotiations between the 
JPBPA, the NPB, and MLB in the lead up to the expiry of the current Posting 
Agreement in December 2016.  The pending negotiations need to see the reform 
agenda expand to include problems caused by normative practice, and the abil-
ity of the posting system to create career opportunities for all players, not just a 
small percentage of elite players.  The Posting Agreement should not be viewed 
as part of a bilateral relationship between two wealthy professional leagues, but 
as part of a global labor system that requires regulation by a global regulatory 
system.  
